Student Comments by unknown
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 65 | Issue 2 Article 3
1974
Student Comments
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Student Comments, 65 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 170 (1974)
THE JouSAL or CnonNAL LAW & CRfUNOLoGY
Copyright Q 1974 by Northwestern University School of Law
COMMENTS
Student contributors to this issue are Daniel Swartzman, Mark D. Lipton,
Deborah L. La Dolce, and Eloy Burciaga.
PLEA BARGAINING MISHAPS-THE POSSIBILITY OF COLLATERALLY
ATTACKING THE RESULTANT PLEA OF GUILTY
This comment is aimed at the practitioner. It is
a survey of the law dealing with the collateral: at-
tack of guilty pleas and is directed to those who
may encounter this problem in their work. Nu-
merous law review articles, comments and case
notes have been devoted to the plea bargaining
process and to federal or state collateral attack
procedures. Therefore background in these areas
will be minimal, hopefully serving as a reference
source to other materials dealing with these sub-
jects in more detail. The main focus will be the
problem confronted by the defense attorney whose
client is in jail, victim of a plea bargaining mis-
hap.
1
It has become de rigeur for articles dealing with
guilty pkas to mention that 90 per cent of all
felony convictions in the United States result from
guilty pleas.2 Even without knowing the exact
figure as to what percentage of these are bar-
gained for, it is evident that the defense attorney
will have ample opportunity to come into contact
with the defendant who entered into a plea agree-
ment, or thought he did, only to find that the
bargain was not kept. In what situations will the
attorney be able to help this client? What will he
have to prove? What tenor should his argument
take? These are the questions this article seeks to
answer.
3
I This article is purposely slanted towards a defense
posture. For an article dealing with the role of the
prosecutor after a plea bargaining breakdown, see
Bishop, Broken Bargains, 50 J. Uu L. 231 (1972).2 D. NAER, CONvIcTION, THE DETE uSNATION or
GUiLr OR INNOcENcE WiaTouT TAL 3 (1966) [here-
inafter cited as NElwmAN.
3 The line of cases decided on the basis of whether a
guilty plea was "voluntary and knowing" will not be
examined as they have been dealt with extensively in
commentaries. Further, they speak to the defendant's
attitude towards the plea, whereas the concern here is
with the undesirable result of some plea bargaining
agreements. See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S.
742 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759
(1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970).
For the purposes of the following discussion
four basic problems have been identified, problems
inherent in most plea bargaining situations.4 When
the defendant does not receive the benefit of his
bargain, he has fallen victim to a plea bargaining
mishap. Mishaps may result from the promises of
the prosecution, from the promises of police or
investigators, from the defendant's false belief in
the existence of a bargain or from judicial par-
ticipation in the plea bargaining process. Whether
the mishap arising from one of these instances can
be the grounds for post-conviction relief will be
the paramount question in the discussion to
follow.5
This comment is intended to present the issues
involved in this area, and not to serve as an en-
cyclopedia with full jurisdictional cross references.
Rather, the emphasis will be placed on federal law
with an in-depth analysis of one state, Illinois, in
order to illustrate the various bases of collateral
attack within one jurisdiction.
GunLTY PLEAS AND TE PLEA
BARGAIING PROCESS
A plea agreement most easily can be thought of
as a contract. Normally it takes the form of the
prosecutor's promise exchanged for a plea of
This comment will not deal with the settled area of
judicial admonishment before acceptance of a guilty
plea. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
For a discussion of whether plea bargaining is un-
desirable or per se unconstitutional, see North Carolina
v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
4 Professor Moore lists six problem areas which are
all subsumed in the divisions used in this comment.
8 J. MoO , FEDERAL PRACrscn 11.05(4) at 11-101
to 11-105 (4th ed. 1966).
1 For discussions of the voluntariness or accuracy of
pleas, see Davis, The Guilty Plea Process: Exploring the
Issues of Voluntariness and Accuracy, 6 VAL. U. L. REv.
111 (1972); Comment, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Com-
promises by Prosecutors to Secure Cuilty Pleas, 112 U.
PA. L. REv. 865 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Compro-
mises by Prosecutors].
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guilty by the defendant. The prosecutor's con-
sideration can be a promise to make a sentence
recommendation or to dismiss related charges. The
defendant bargains with his constitutional rights
and his freedom. It has been held that a plea of
guilty is a simultaneous waiver of the defendant's
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, of
the defendant's right to a trial by jury and of the
defendant's right to confront his accusers.
6
Although the process differs from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction,7 certain elements remain the same.8
Bargaining usually begins with informal dis-
cussions between the defense attorney and the
prosecutor. At some point an agreement is reached.
The defense attorney takes the bargain back to
the defendant for his approval. The defendant
pleads guilty and should receive what he bar-
gained for. If he does not, he is the victim of a
plea bargaining mishap, and his recourse is to seek
post-conviction relief.
AvENUEs OF COLLATERAL ATTAcK
Collateral attack for plea bargaining mishaps
can be obtained through direct federal relief,
through state post-conviction proceedings or
through secondary federal action after exhausting
all state remedies. The procedure for attacking a
conviction based on a broken promise is similar to
the attack of any constitutional infirmity in a
criminal conviction. However, due to the peculiar
nature of the defendant's consideration, relief from
a bargained guilty plea has been given a special
status. Thus judge Friendly, who would have any
collateral petition be accompanied by a colorable
protestation of innocence,9 would exempt from
this rule the attack on a bargained-for guilty plea. 0
6McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969).
For a unique look at the plea bargaining process in
one state, by means of an extensive survey of state
prosecutors, see Klonoski, vitchel & Gallagher, Plea
Bargaining in Oregon: An E ploratory Study, 50 ORE.
L. Rzv. 114 (1971).8See generally NEwmAN, supra note 2; Bishop,
Rights and Responsibilities of the Defendant Pleading
Guilty, 49 J. URBAN L. 1 (1971); Davis, The Guilty
Plea Process: Exploring the Issues of Voluntariness and
Accuracy, 6 VAr. U. L. Rxv. 111 (1972); Gentile, Fair
Bargains and Accurae Pleas, 49 B. U. L. Rxv. 514
(1969); Thomas, Plea Bargaining and the Turner Case,
1970 Can. L. R. 559 (1970); White, A Proposal for
Reform of the Plea Bargaining Process, 119 U. PA. L.
Rxv. 439 (1971); Compromises by Prosecutors, supra
note 5; Comment, Plea Bargaining-ustice Off the
Record, 9 WAsHBURx L.J. 430 (1970).
9 Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack
on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Cma. L. Rsv. 142, 160
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Friendly].
'OId. at 152. See also People V. Gustavson, 131 Ill.
App. 2d 887, 269 N.E.2d 517 (1971).
A collateral petition, then, is not concerned with
the facts of the indictment. Rather, the facts of
the contract and the breach of that agreement
must be emphasized."'
Before continuing with the discussion of the
various avenues of collateral attack, it should be
mentioned that one of the most important actions
the defense attorney can take is not at all col-
lateral. This is the motion to withdraw -the plea of
guilty.12 This may be done most effectively prior to
sentencing if the attorney is involved at thatstage
and if it has become clear that the bargain is going
to fail. It also may be done after sentencing. In
either case, granting the motion is within the
sound discretion of the trial judge.u The American
Bar Association has recommended that failure of a
plea agreement be considered grounds for with-
drawalof the plea,14 and cases have held that when
there was no motion to withdraw the plea, the
defense is estopped from later relief.15
If a motion to withdraw has been made and
denied, or if the attorney has entered the .arena
too late to use that weapon, a petition for col-
lateral relief may be filed. There are three avenues
of collateral attack: direct federal relief under 28
U.S.C. § 2255, direct state relief and secondary
federal relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Which one
to use is a function of the court in which the con-
iction was obtained. Direct federal relief is avail-
able'from'a conviction in a federal district court.
If the conviction is entered in a state court, relief
may be sought *under that state's 'collateral pro-
cedures. Where all state remedies have been ex-
hausted, relief is available under 28 U.S.C.'§ 2254.
If the defendant entered his plea in. a federal
court, he may attack it by using 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
This codified version of earlier case law allows
relief for violations of constitutional rights in
1 In England, there is no collateral attack procedure
available in plea bargaining mishap situations, and the
defendant must rely on the extensive use of executive
clemency. See Friendly, supra note 9, at 151 & n.35.
12 For a discussion on withdrawals of pleas see Com.
monwealth v. Forbes, 450 Pa. 185, 299 A.2d 268 (1973)-
1 FED. R. Can. P. 32, 28 U.S.C. § 32 (1973). See also
United States ex rd. Culbreath v. Rundle, 466F.2d 730
(3d Cir. 1972).
'4An sRcAN BAR AssociATioN, PRoJEcT ON MinI-
m STANDARDS FOR CMINAL JUSTICE, STmDARS
RELATING TO P EAS OF GUILTY, Approved Draft; 53
(1968) [hereinafter cited as MmwuM STANDARDS].
See also Mnm'oU STANDARDS 57.
1 Lambur v. Slayton, 356 F. Supp. 747, 751 (E.D.
Va. 1973); People v. Hancasky, 410 Ill. 148, 101 N.E.2d
575 (1951).
Failing to withdraw a guilty plea may hurt the credi-
bility of the defendant's claim, as well.
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sentencing procedure, for convictions without
proper jurisdiction, for illegal sentences and for
problems otherwise subject to collateral attack.' 6
Plea bargaining mishaps generally are treated as a
violation of constitutional rights for the purpose of
collateral attack, although there is some doubt as
to whether they do reach constitutional dimen-
sion.
17
As in all collateral proceedings of this nature,
the petition under § 2255 is sent to the court from
which the conviction was received. The hearing
judge will either deny the petition outright, make
a decision on the merits based upon the petition's
allegations and the record or order an evidentiary
hearing. Because the vast majority of cases are
stopped at the petition stage' 8 and because any
summary decision on the merits is not likely to be
favorable to the petitioner, " the defense attorney
should request an evidentiary hearing. Once the
hearing is granted the attorney must show that a
mishap has occurred and that relief can be pro-
vided.
If the defendant has entered his plea in a state
court, he must seek relief under that state's post-
conviction provisions.20 In 1963, it was held that
states must provide some opportunity for post-
conviction relief.2' The Uniform Post-Conviction
Procedure Actn has not yet been adopted by a
1628 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970). For a discussion of the
history and use of § 2255 see Uelman, Post-Conviction
Relief for Federal Prisoners, A Survey and a Suggestion
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, 69 W. VA. L. REv. 277 (1967).
In 1969 federal prisoners filed 2,817 such petitions,
a 50 per cent increase over 1964. In the year 1969,
petitions for mistreatment in prisons, petitions under
28 U.S.C. § 2255 and petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2254,
all combined, accounted for one-sixth of all civil filings,
larger than any other single action. Friendly, supra
note 9, at 144.
17 See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971),
and the discussion of that case in the text accompany-
ing note.
i. Federal collateral remedies yield no result in 90
per cent of the cases, a totally favorable result in only 2
per cent. Friendly, supra note 9, at 148 n.25.
29 See generally Friendly.
20 Some states, prior to enacting post-conviction acts,
treated the mishap problem on appeal. Some states still
maintain this practice. The grounds for successful col-
lateral attack do not differ from the grounds for suc-
cessful appeal, but the procedure may vary from state
to state.
21 Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963); Fay
v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372
U.S. 293 (1963).
For a discussion of these cases and their impact, see
State Post-Conviction Remedies and Federal Habeas
Corpus, 12 W. & M.L. REv. 149, 157, 176-179 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as State Remedies]; Comment, State
Post-Conviction Remedies and Federal Habeas Corpus,
40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 154 (1965).2 For a discussion of the Uniform Post-Conviction
majority of the states,23 so relief varies from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 4 Since a state by state
procedural study is beyond the scope of this
comment,25 the Illinois procedures for collateral
attack will be used to illustrate how state col-
lateral attack can be used in plea bargaining mishap
cases.
The Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act2" has
been cited as a model act, giving maximum relief
with maximum efficiencyY It provides relief for
violations of either the Illinois or the Federal
Constitution. Upon submission of a petition veri-
fied by affidavits to the court of conviction anyone
imprisoned in an Illinois prison may be granted
relief. The petitioner has twenty years from the
occurrence complained of in which to file. s As with
a petition to any court, the post-conviction peti-
tion must be clear and factual,2 and will be denied
if found incomplete or conclusory.3 " The prisoner
must attach any affidavits, records or depositions
pertinent to his allegations or explain their absence
in the petition." The prisoner may submit his
Procedure Act, see State Remedies, supra note 21, at
179-183.
2 Id.
24 This difference may often be crucial, as in different
statutes of limitation for bringing the post-conviction
action: Wisconsin has a one year limitation, Wyoming
has a five year limitation and Illinois has a twenty year
limitation.
25 For a state-by-state summary see State Remedies,
supra note 21, at 170, 183-233.
For other articles concerning state post-conviction
relief see Anderson, Post-Conviction Relief in Missouri-
Five Years Under Amended Rude 27.26, 38 Mo. L. REv.
1 (1973); Fairchild, Post-Conviction Rights and Remedies
in Wisconsin, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 52 (1965); Herman,
Symposium on Post-Conviction Remedies, 27 Omo
S.L.J. 237 (1966) (Ohio); Leighton, Post-Conviction
Remedies in Illinois Criminal Procedure, 1966 U. ILn.
L. F. 540 (1966); Raper, Post Conviction Remedies, 19
Wyo. L. J. 213 (1965) (Wyoming); Young, Post
Conviction Belief in Pennsylvania, 74 Dicx L. REv. 703
(1970); Comment, Post-Conviction Relief in Arkansas,
24 Asi. L. Rmv. 57 (1970); Comment, Post Conviction
Remedy Procedure in Indiana, 48 NoTm DAmE LAW.
435 (1972); Comment, Operation of the Ohio Post Con-
viction Remedy Act, 29 Omo S.L.J. 727 (1968); Com-
ment, Plea-Bargaining-Justice Off the Record, 9
WAsEBnpx L.J. 430 (1970) (Kansas).
26 ILL. Rcv. STAT., ch. 38, § 122-1 et seq. (1971).
27Fairchild, Post-Conviction Rights and Remedies
in Wisconsin, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 52, 65 (1965).
2 This was amended from the original five years in
1965 and has been held to be retroactive in effect.
People v. Covington, 45 Ill. 2d 105, 257 N.E.2d 106
(1970).29 People v. Wall, 7 Ill. App. 3d 579, 288 N.E.2d
123 (1972).
30 People v. Pierce, 48 Ill. 2d 48, 268 N.E.2d 273
(1971).
31 People v. Washington, 38 Ill. 2d 446, 232 N.E.2d
738 (1967) (petitioner explained in petition that he was
too poor to afford affidavits). Cf. People v. Williams. 47
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petition pro se, stating that he is indigent and
wishes a lawyer to be appointed. Appointed counsel
may then amend the petition. As in the § 2255
review, the court may deny the petition, make a
finding on the merits based on the record and the
allegations, or grant an evidentiary hearing. As in
the case of direct federal review, the court must
find that the record shows conclusively that the
petitioner is entitled to no relief before denying
the petition." The Illinois act also provides for
appellate review of a post-conviction decision.
If the defendant has sought state relief but,
after exhausting all available state remedies, has
failed; he may avail himself of a third avenue of
collateral attack. This is the codified version of the
federal writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254,31 which is an increasingly popular remedy,"
although not very fruitful. 5 To quality for § 2254
relief, the petitioner must show that (1) the merits
of the factual dispute were not resolved at the
state level, (2) any state resolution was not fairly
supported by the facts, taken as a whole, (3) the
state fact-finding was not adequate to give the
case a full and fair hearing, (4) material facts
were not adequately developed at the state level,
or (5) there was no representation by counsel at
the state level.36
CREDIBILITY AND FoRMALITY CONSIDERATIONs
Two general precautions must precede any dis-
cussion of the various mishaps and the possibility
of collaterally attacking them. First, to be granted
an evidentiary hearing and, more importantly, to
obtain post-conviction relief, the defendant's al-
legations must be credible. Second, the defense
Ill. 2d 1, 264 N.E.2d 697 (1970) (not sufficient for state
to claim no affidavits where state does not adequately
refute allegations of petition); People v. Bennett, 9 Ill.
App. 3d 332, 292 N.E.2d 159 (1972) (petition denied
because petitioner stated no reasons for lack of affi-
davits). See generally People v. Wegner, 39 Ill. 2d 28,
237 N.E.2d 486 (1968) (affidavit of lawyer who allegedly
lied to defendant held unnecessary).
2Cemiglia v. United States, 230 F. Supp. 932 (N.D.
I2. 1964); People v. Sigafus, 39 Ill. 2d 68, 233 N.E.2d
386 (1968).
mFor a history of this statute and a discussion of
exhausting state remedies see Stote Remedies, supra
note 21, at 151-153.
m In 1969, state prisoners filed 7,359 petitions under
§ 2254. This was a 100 per cent increase over 1964.
Friendly, supra note 9, at 143.
25 See State Remedies, supra note 21, at 160-169
(table of petitions filed and action taken in Federal
Circuits from 1962 to 1968).
31See Raper, Post Conviction Remedies, 19 Wyo.
L.J. 213, 220 (1965). For a general discussion of the use
of § 2254, see Mayers, Federal Review of State Convic-
tions: The Need for Procedural Reappraisal, 34 GEo.
WAsH. L. REv. 615 (1966).
attorney must be aware of the formalities of the
plea bargaining process in some states, specifically
the defendant's stating for the record that his plea
is not the result of any threat or promise, in order
to successfully meet any argument that the de-
fendant is bound by his recorded testimony.
A defendant may have a valid claim, but if it
strikes the court as incredible, he is likely to loseY
Credibility may be damaged by many different
causes." There may be "facts in the record relating
to the issue of promises which fairly contradict the
defendant's claim." 3 9 If it is shown that: a witness
has refused to give a supporting affidavit'0 or if, in
the case where a new attorney has been retained
post-conviction, the defendant's trial attorney
submits an affidavit refuting subsequent allega-
tions,4' the credibility of the defendant's case may
be seriously damaged. If the defendant failed to
complain of the broken promise at any relevant
time in the past, whether at sentencing or by
failing to move to withdraw the plea, the court
may not believe the present claim.4 Credibility is
inversely proportionate to the amount of time be-
tween conviction and petitioning for collateral
relief." It is important for the lawyer to exmine
his case in order to compensate for any factors
which might hurt his client's credibility. This may
require foreseeing any credibility gaps which could
raise questions in a judge's mind and presenting
an explanation before they are challenged, or it
may require the lawyer to shape the tenor of the
petition's allegations to emphasize the peculiarity
of the instant case, forestalling the judge's gen-
eralization that the particular situation is like all
of the rest-incredible. Although it is not an ele-
ment of proof in a plea bargaining mishap review,
the innocence of the defendant is likely to be
severely questioned by the judge." Any argument
"See Eaton v. United States, 458 F.2d 704, 707
(7th Cir. 1972).
ISee generally Bishop, Rights and Responsibilities of
the Defendant Pleading Cuilty, 49 J. URBAN L. 1, 23
(1971) (review of Michigan credibility cases).
39 People v. Gaines, 48 Ill. 2d 191, 194, 268 N.E.2d
426, 428 (1971).
40 People v. Wall, 7 Ill. App.3d 579, 288 N.E.2d 123
(1972).
41 People v. Jewett, 4 Ill. App. 3d 738, 281 N.E.2d
693 (1972).
4People v. Spicer, 47 Ill. 2d 114, 264 N.E.2d 181
(1971).
"Petraborg v. United States, 432 F.2d 1194 (7th
Cir. 1970) (5Y/2 year lapse); People v. Gaines, 48 Ill.
2d 191, 268 N.E.2d 426 (1971) (62 month gap).
4 judge Friendly has said that in eleven years on the
bench, he encountered only six cases where he "enter-
tained real doubt about a defendant's guilt." Friendly,
supra note 9, at 160.
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must overcome the judge's predisposition to view
the prisoner's claim as just another attempt -to
"beat- the rap."
A petition must raise a credible issue of material
fact to overcome the hurdle of the "for the record"
formalities still left in the- plea bargaining, pro-
cedures of many jurisdictions." These formalities
usually take the form of a "monosyllabic negative
reply" 41 to the judge's routine question, "Has
your plea been coerced or induced by any threats
or promises made to you by anyone?" While there
are cases in which the "No" answer has been taken
literally; 7 the most prevalent practice is to view
the "No" answer as mere- "courtroom ritual,"
joined in by the judge, the prosecutor, the defense
attorney and the defendant, in which all the
participants know the negotiation has-taken place.48
Although the "No" answer to the "threats and
promises" question is usually not held to be con-
clusive evidence of the absence of any threats or
promises, 9 or of any "controlling weight or Sig-
nificance," 50 it is "evidential." 51 Generally:
[Flormalistic recitations in the record that indicate
the plea was "voluntary" cannot prevent the per-
son convicted from complaining if the prosecutor
later breaches the agreement that induced the
plea. 2
Even though the "No" answer may be given
little or-no weight in the judge's consideration of
the petitioner's case,O the defense attorney may
still be called on to explain why his client answered
in that fashion and should be prepared to support
the credibility of his client's claim, even in light
of a negative response at the arraignment.
Consideration must be given to this "formality"
because it is often a peg on which the judge will
hang his decision. Thus, in the case where a
prisoner presents an incredible claim, the reviewing
45 See Walters v. Harris, 460 F.2d 988, 992 (4th Cir.
1972).
46 NEWmAN, supra note 2, at 31.
4 Tyler v. State, 296 N.E.2d 140, 144 (Ind. App.
1973).
48 TIE PRESIENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCE-
MENT AND ADMINISTRATION or JusTicE, TASK FoacE
REPORT: THE CoURTs 9 (1967). [hereinafter cited as
TASK FoRcE].
41 State ex rd. Clancy v. Coiner, 179 S.E.2d 726, 733
(W. Va. 1971).
50 Mosher v. LaVallee, 350 F. Supp. 1101, 1107
(S.D.N.Y. 1972).
"1United States v. Tateo, 214 F. Supp. 560, 564
(S.D.N.Y. 1963).
52 Gallegos v. United States, 466 F.2d 740, 742 (5th
Cir. 1972).
" Dube v. State, Ind. , 275 N.E.2d 7, 8 (1971).
judge may use the "no threats or promises" answer
as a rationale for finding against the petitioner."
A further interrelationship between the credibility
and the formality considerations is that the "no
threats or promises" issue may hurt the credibility
of the defendant at the evidentiary hearing. 55
PiEA BARGAINING MISEIAPS
Only if it is generally believed that performance on
the part of the state will not disappoint.a defend-
ant's reasonable expectations will plea bargaining
become and remain a truly effective device in
criminal administration. Aside from this prag-
matic necessity, essential fairness dictates the same
result.56
Today plea bargaining mishap situations are
often spoken of in contractual terms: negotiation,
promise, inducement, expectation, consideration,
reliance, promissory estoppel, benefit of the bar-
gain and performance. Originally, however, the
language was the typical lexicon of the funda-
mental fairness and due process decisions based
on the fourteenth amendment: voluntary, knowing
and waiver. The earlier attacks on guilty pleas
(bargained or not) were on the basis of involun-
tariness, unintelligent decision and uninformed
waiver. ,7 The cases today have isolated the bar-
gained-for plea and in the case of the mishap have
held that a defendant should be granted relief, not
because his plea was involuntary, but because it
was induced by an unfulfilled promise. Newman,
in the most widely cited work in this area, says
that "the apparent basis of such reversal is an out-
raged sense of fairness... ." " He further states:
The test most often applied to inducement by
promises of leniency is whether the promises were
proper and were kept.... [Aippellate courts dis-
tinguish between what has been called "honorable"
plea arrangements and those where the State
does not fulfill its side of the bargain.19
The leading case in this area, and the only case
in which the United States Supreme Court has
U People v. Spicer, 47 Ill. 2d 114, 264 N.E.2d 181
(1970).
45 See People v. Gaines, 48 Ill. 2d 191, 268 N.E.2d
426 (1971); Dees v. State, 492 S.W.2d 849, 857 (Mo.
App. 1973).
16 State v. Thomas, 61 N.J. 314, 321, 294 A.2d 57,
61 (1972).
67 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970);
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); McCarthy
v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969); Machibroda v.
United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962).
63 NEwM AN, supra note 2, at 56.
51 Id. at 29-30.
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squarely faced the issue of the broken promise, is
Santobello v. New York.60 Originally, Santobello
pleaded not guilty to three counts of New York
gambling violations. After some discussion between
the defense attorney and the state prosecutor,
Santobello agreed to plead to a lesser-included
offense, in return for which the prosecutor prom-
ised to make no sentence recommendation. Sen-
tencing was delayed for six months. In he interim,
the prosecutor was replaced. This new prosecutor
recommended the maximum sentence at the
hearing in mitigation and aggravation. The maxi-
mum sentence of one year was imposed, and the
defendant appealed his conviction. The New York
appellate division affirmed and the court of appeals
denied leave to appeal. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari and held that:
[Wihen a plea rests in any significant degree on a
promise or agreement of the prosecutor,, so that it
can be said to be part of the inducement or con-
sideration, such promise must be fulfilled. 61
The Court held that the prosecutor's office had a
duty to let the right hand know what the left was
doing. They remanded the case to the appropriate
state court for a determination as to whether the
appellant should receive a new sentence from a
new judge-with no recommendation (benefit of the
bargain) or whether the appellant should be al-
lowed to plead anew to the indictment.
62
There is some confusion as to the basis of the
majority's decision. There is no discussion of the
long line of cases based on involuntary and un-
knowing pleas,6 3 and none of these cases were
cited. There is no discussion of fundamental fair-
ness or other due process cases. Furthermore, this
case was not an: exercise of the Supreme Court's
supervisory powers over federal courts since
Santobello's case arose in a state court. In fact,
the Court cites no cases as controlling in this
factual situation. The decision appears to rest on
the "interest of justice and appropriate recognition
of the duties of the prosecution in relation to
promises made in the negotiation of pleas of
60 404 U.S. 257 (1971). See also Note, Crimina2 Law-
Enforcement of Plea Bargaining Agreements, 51 N.C.L.
Rnv.' 602 (1973).
61404 U.S. at 262.
2Justices Marshall, Brennan and Stewart agreed
with the decision to reverse the conviction, but felt that
the petitioner should receive the relief prayed for-
complete reversal. 404 U.S. at 267 (Marshall, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part.)
"1 See notes 3 & 8 supra.
guilty.... " " In light of this language, it is not
clear whether the decision was based on funda-
mental fairness or whether it is a decision man-
dated, not by the constitution, but by the facts
alone. 
5
Because this decision is generally viewed as not
reaching constitutional dimensions, it has not been
cited as controlling in state court opinions, only
as supportive. 6  However, some states have "in-
dependently" reached the same result. Santobelo
has been cited in numerous federal decisions as the
law in this situation,6" and its weight, if only by
analogy, is considerable.
A. Promises by the Prosecutor
Santobello holds that if a prosecutor makes a
promise and later breaks it, the defendant should
be granted relief. But what sort of promises can or
will the prosecutor make and when is he held to
have broken them?
The most typical promise by the prosecutor is
that of leniency, manifested in the form of either
a sentence recommendation, or, in the case where
the prosecutor could clearly influence the-judge in
imposing a higher sentence, no recommendation.
In these situations, the prosecutor who fails to
make the recommendation or breaks his promise
to not do so, has not fulfilled his side of the bar-
gain.60 So, too, if the defendant bargains for a
'A 404 U.S. at 262.6 .Mr. Justice Douglas submitted a concurring opin-
ion in which he advocated raising this decision to a
constitutionally mandateddecision. Id. at 267 (Dofiglas,
J., concurring). This would support the conclusion that
Santobdlo is not a '"constitutional" decision.
e6 See State v. Richard, 109 Ariz. 65, 505 P. 2d 236,
239-40 (1973); People v. Stevens; 45 Mich. App. 689,
206 N.W.2d 757 (1973); People v. Craig, 41 App. Div.
2d 932, 343 N.Y.S.2d 365 (1973); Lambert v. State,
- S.C. -, 198 S.E.2d 118 (1973); In re Bishop, 303
A.2d 154 (Vt. 1973).
"67See People v. Pier, 51 Ill. 2d 96, 281 N.E.2d 289
(1972).
[Wihen a plea of guilty rests in any significant way
pon a promise or agreement of a prosecutor so that
the same can be said to-be a part of the induce-
ment or consideration, the promise must be ful-
filled. A plea of guilty made in reliance on an un-
fulfilled promise is not voluntarily made by the
defendant.
Id. at 291.
8See United States v. Hallam, 472 F.2d 168 (9th
Cir. 1973); Gallagos v. United States, 466 F.2d 740
(5th Cir. 1972); Walters v. Harris, 460 F.2d 988 (4th
Cir. 1972).
Though not widely noted, Santobello hasfounditsway
into a commentary or two. See Erickson, The Finality of
a Plea of Guilty, 48 NoTPR DAmE LAw. 835 (1973); 8
J.-MooRE, FED1AI. PRAcrscE 11.05 (1) at 11-84
(4th Ed. 1966).6
9 "In dealing with guilty pleas clearly- induced by
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specific recommendation and receives only a gen-
eral one, he will be granted relief .7 If the pros-
ecutor promises to recommend a specific sentence
and then employs a recidivist or habitual criminal
statute at sentencing which has a minimum sen-
tence higher than the one bargained for, the
prosecutor will have broken his promise?' The
state will also be forced to abide by a promise not
to introduce evidence in aggravation at sentenc-
ing.n Prosecutors are often willing to dismiss re-
lated counts of one indictment or drop charges
arising from wholly unrelated incidents. If the
state's attorney promises to do so, he will be held
to it.5'
At times, the defendant elicits what appears to
be a good bargain, and then finds that he is none-
theless a victim of a mishap. In People v. Brock, 4
the Illinois state's attorney agreed to attempt to
get charges pending in Tennessee dropped. The
defendant, in return, pleaded guilty. When the
defendant later claimed that the charges were not
dropped, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the
defendant had received what he bargained for-
the state's attempt to get the charges dropped.
Generally, when theprosecutor makes a promise,
the defendant pleads guilty and the promise is
broken, a court will reach the result reached in
SantobelloJ5 Prosecutors have attempted to avoid
promises of leniency, appellate courts have generally
required that the prosecution honor promises made."
NEWmAN, supra note 2, at 36.
70 Correale v. United States, 479 F.2d 944 (lst Cir.
1973) (promise to recommend sentence to run con-
currently with state sentence).
71 Gallegos v. United States, 466 F.2d 740 (5th Cir.
1972).
72 People v. Schleyhahn, 4 Ill. App. 3d 591, 281
N.E.2d 409 (1972) (dicta).
" See United States v. Hallam, 472 F.2d 168, 169
(9th Cir. 1973) (prosecutor may not reinstitute dis-
missed indictment); United States v. Paiva, 294 F.
Supp. 742 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (prosecutor may not indict
on non-related matter); State v. Thomas, 61 N.J. 314,
294 A.2d 57 (1972) (prosecutor may not reinstitute
dismissed indictment).
74 45 IIl. 2d 292, 259 N.E.2d 12 (1970).
7 However, in People v. Carter, 73 Misc. 1040, 343
N.Y.S.2d 431 (Sup. Ct. 1973), the defendant agreed to
waive a preliminary hearing in return for the prosecu-
tor's promise to press only a misdemeanor charge. When
the defendant was indicted for a felony, the court said,
"[Tihere is no absolute right to enforce bargains entered
into between the prosecution and the defense." Id. at
433. The court refused to extend Santobello to this situa-
tion. This may be indicative of a generalunwillingness to
extend the Santobello reasoning to other factual situa-
tions. There is language in the decision limiting the ra-
tionale to the specific facts. See 404 U.S. at 262. See
also Martinez v. Mancusi, 409 U.S. 959 (1972), a memo-
randum decision denying certiorari. Mr. Justice Douglas
submitted a dissenting opinion saying that where the
this rule in many cases, using various arguments;
few have proved successful. For example, it is
considered irrelevant that the defendant had no
defense or that the defense offered would have
availed him nothing.76 One prosecutor claimed that
there was no reliance on his promise because the
defendant knew that the recommendation would
not be binding on the judge. The court held this to
be inconsequential. 7 Many prosecutors have made
an argument that goes to the materiality of their
promise. Since the judge is not bound by state-
ments of the prosecutor, the fact that a promise
was made is immaterial. This argument was
specifically rejected in Santobello.78 In Correale v.
United States, 7 9 the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit rejected this argument on the rationale
that the defendant gives his plea of guilty "not in
exchange for the actual sentence or impact on the
judge, but for the prosecutor's statements in
court." 10 If these statements are not adequate, the
bargain is invalid.
B. Promises by Police
Often, a defendant will plead guilty in reliance
upon the representations of a policeman or an
investigator. These representations may also form
the grounds for a post-conviction remedy, but the
petitioner must show either actual or apparent
authority on the part of the investigator to act as
an agent of the prosecutor before Santobello would
apply.8 ' Therefore, broken promises made by a
policeman who said he was representing the pros-
ecutor, s2 by a sheriff who appeared to have au-
thority83 and by the prosecutor's chief investi-
defendant was trapped by his plea into going to trial or
settling for a plea to a crime of higher degree than origi-
nally agreed upon, Santobello applied.
This reluctance to extend Santobello beyond its facts
may also be the result of the lack of any definitive basis
for the decision.
76 People v. Gustavson, 131 Ill. App. 2d 887, 269
N.E.2d 517 (1971).7 McKeag v. People, 7 Ill. 2d 586, 131 N.E.2d 517
(1956).
17 404 U.S. at 262. See also White, A Proposal for
Reform of the Plea Bargaining Process, 119 U. PA. L.
Rsv. 439, 473 (1971).
79 479 F.2d 944 (1st Cir. 1973).
so Id. at 949.
81 Manning v. State, 374 P.2d 796 (Okla. Cr. App.
1962); see Comment, Criminal Law: Plea Withdrawal
in Oklahoma, 23 OKLA. L. Rnv. 472, 476 (1970); cf.
United States v. Lombardozzi, 467 F.2d 160 (2d Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1108 (1973).
82 McKeag v. People, 7 Ill. 2d 586, 131 N.E.2d 517
(1956).
0 People v. Gustavson, 131 Ill. App. 2d 887, 269
N.E. 2d 517 (1971).
[Vol. 65
PLEA BARGAINING
gators' have been held to be grounds for collateral
attack. The defendant must also show that he
relied on this authority for pleading guilty. 5 In
United States v. Lombardozzi,86 the defendant who
had approached the federal agent was held to have
had knowledge of the fact that the agent was not
speaking for the prosecutor. Since the court could
not find a manifestation of authority nor reliance,
relief was denied.
C. Mistaken Belief in the Existence of a Deal
Even if it can be proved beyond a doubt that the
defendant entered his plea on the mistaken belief
that a deal existed, he is unlikely to obtain relief.
The defendant may get relief if he shows a mistake
in law,8 but if he claims a mistake of fact, this will
prove insufficient for collateral attack.
The earlier decisions in this area held that if the
defendant could prove his mistaken belief in the
existence of a deal, a belief which induced his
guilty plea, the defendant would be allowed relief.
This so-ealled "subjective" test in determining
grounds for relief was first utilized in the much-
cited case of United States ex rel. Thurmond v.
Mancusi.P Today a few jurisdictions still hold to
this view. Foremost among these is West Virginia.
In State ex rel. Clancy v. Coiner,"9 the Supreme
Court of West Virginia was confronted with two
consolidated appeals. One petitioner was granted
relief on the grounds of an actual broken promise.
The other petitioner proved to the court's satis-
faction that he had had a mistaken belief in the
existence of a deal. The court upheld the subjective
test and granted him relief, relying in part on
Thurmond.
However, more recent decisions in this area
clearly deny the validity of the "subjective" test.
Today, in most jurisdictions, the defendant must
show an actual promise was made, that he relied
upon it, and that it was broken. This is the "objec-
tive" test. Although the district court judge in
84 Dube v. State, - Ind. -' -' 275 N.E.2d 7, 8
(1971).
8 5 Manning v. State, 374 P.2d 796 (Okla. Cr. App.
1962). See also United States v. Lombardozzi, 467
F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 409. US. 1108
(1973); Comment, Criminal Law: Plea Withdrawal in
Oklahoma, 23 OKLA. L. REv. 472 (1970).
86 467 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1108 (1973).
87 Cross v. State, 248 Ark. 553,452 S.W.2d 854 (1970).
8s 275 F. Supp. 508 (1967).
179 S.E.2d 726 (W. Va. 1971). See also Note,
Criminal Law-Plea Bargaining-Withdrawal of Guilty
Plea. 74 W. VA. L. R.v. 196 (1972).
Thurmond wrote an impressive opinion, that case
was overruled as to the subjective test in United
States ex rel. LaFay v. Fritz8 0 The rationale for
rejecting the subjective test was stated in Johnson
v. Beto9' where the court granted the petitioner
relief using an "objective" test:
Analogous to promissory estoppel, plea bargain-
ing must have more substantiality than mere
expectation and hope. It must have explicit
expression and reliance and is measured by ob-
jective not subjective standards. All of the ele-
ments of the plea bargain was [sic] found here, and
the law gives its sanctions to such bargains when
they are real and not mere figments.8'
Again, as noted in United States v. Taylor:9'
The fact that the defendant may have had the ex-
pectation that his plea would result in leniency is
not sufficient in the absence that the expectation
was induced by tie government to justify with-
drawal [or collateral attack] 'of the plea of guilty.H
There is another situation in which the de-
fendant has a mistaken belief in the existence of a
deal, a belief not induced by the government. This
is the case where the defendant pleads guilty in
reliance on misrepresentations made by his trial
attorney. Sometimes this situation forms the basis
of an "ineffective assistance of counsel" argument. 5
When such a claim is made, the misrepresentation
must amount to "such a kind as to shock the
conscience of the court and make the proceedings
a farce and a mockery of justice." 11
Representations by the defense attorney can also
be grounds for a collateral attack as a plea bar-
gaining mishap, but the defendant has a hard
burden to overcome due to judicial prejudice
against this claim. 97 The standard of proof in this
area is formidable in many jurisdictions. For
instance, even the more lenient decisions have held
80455 F.2d 297 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 923
(1972).
91466 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1972).
92 Id. at 480. See Mosher v. LaVallee 351 F. Supp.
1101, 1108 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
83303 F.2d 165 (4th Cir. 1962).
94Id. at 168.
95 State v. Tunender, 182 Neb. 701, 157 N.W. 2d
165 (1968).
96 United States v. Horton, 334 F.2d 153, 155 (2d
Cir. 1964).
For example, the court in United States v. Horton
concluded that to allow the claim of a defense attor-
ney's misrepresentation to vitiate a plea "Would afford
an all too easy avenue for the invalidating of convic-
tions on pleas of guilty." Id. at 154.
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that a defense attorney's wrong prediction of the
judge's action is not sufficient to vitiate the in-
duced plea of guilty,98 that an erroneous estimate
by the attorney99 or mistaken impression on the
part of the attorney0" are not sufficient grounds
for attacking a conviction, even if they have in-
duced the plea. According to one commentator:
A lawyer may be mistaken.... His advice may be
open to question.... Nevertheless, a conviction
will not be upset merely for those reasons. As long
as there is no misrepresentation clothing an opinon
in the guise of a guarantee... the defendant has
received that to which he is entitled. The sixth
amendment guarantees that a defendant will have
the benefit of sound, professional judgment. It
does not guarantee infallibility.102
Plea bargaining mishaps arising from the mis-
representations of the defense attorney may form
the basis of a collateral attack if the misrepresenta-
tions amount to a fraud upon the defendant.'0
Courts speak of such inducements with language
such as "bald" and "conclusive." 103 Where counsel
represented that he was authorized to make a
promise on behalf of the prosecutor and this was
corroborated by statements by the prosecutor as-
suring the judge's cooperation, the defendant was
able to successfully attack his conviction.'4 In
People v. Williams,'°  the defendant was given an
evidentiary hearing when he claimed that his
attorney told him that the state had agreed to a
lenient sentence, that further, when he was given a
harsh sentence, the attorney whispered to him that
the judge would call him back later and give him
the "bargained for" term, even though there was
no state corroboration.
Many courts require a petitioner to show some
corroborating representation by the prosecutor or
the judge supporting the petitioner's claim of
reliance on the defense attorney's misrepresenta-
98See Masciola v. United States, 469 F.2d 1057
(3d Cir. 1972).
" Mosher v. LaVallee, 351 F. Supp. 1101 (S.D.N.Y.
1972) (dicta).
10OHolt v. United States, 329 F.2d 368 (7th Cir.)
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 992 (1964); Mosher v. LaVallee,
351 F. Supp. 1101 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (dicta); Dees v.
State, 492 S.W. 2d 849, 857 (Mo. App. 1973).
101 Gentile, Fair Bargains and Accurate Pleas, 49
B.U.L. REv. 514, 540 (1969).
.
02 Long v. State, 231 Ind. 59, 106 N.E.2d 692 (1952).
103 People v. Shneer, 194 F.2d 598, 601 (3rd Cir.
1952) (dicta).
104Petraborg v. United States, 432 F.2d 1194, 1197
(7th Cir. 1970).
105 47 Ill. 2d 1, 264 N.E.2d 697 (1970).
tion. In one such case, People v. Gilbert,00 the
court went so far as to say that "unwarranted or
even willfully false statements of factual matters
by his [the defendant's] attorney" will not suffice
to vitiate the plea, absent corroboration by the
state.' 7 Other courts have held that defense
counsel's assurance is sufficient without cor-
roboration.10 In Brown v. State,'09 the Missouri
supreme court said that a guilty plea induced by a
mistaken belief in the existence of a binding agree-
ment was invalid merely upon the defendant's
showing that he had been misled by the judge, the
prosecutor or by his own attorney.1 0
There is no hard line that can be drawn in these
cases as to what actions will be deemed "suf-
ficient misrepresentations," "frauds on the de-
fendant," "assurances" or "guarantees." When
the defendant's mistaken belief is the result of a
misrepresentation by trial counsel, the success of a
collateral attack will depend on how blatant the
lawyer's conduct was and what the law of the
jurisdiction is.
D. Judicial Participation in the Plea Bargaining
Process
Several questions arise in connection with the
judge's role in the plea bargaining process. First,
is judicial participation, per se, a mishap which
should give rise to collateral relief? Second, is the
judge bound by promises of the prosecutor and if
not, can a defendant collaterally attack a sentence
imposed that is higher than the one bargained for?
Much has been written about judicial participa-
tion in the plea bargaining process. Some authori-
ties say that the judge should have absolutely
nothing to do with the process,"' that any par-
ticipation is undesirable per se.U2 Other authorities
106 25 Cal. 2d 422, 154 P.2d 657 (1944). See People v.
Rodriguez, - Cal. 2d __, __, 299 P.2d 1057, 1058
(1956); cf. Gallegos v. United States, 466 F.2d 740
(5th Cir. 1972).
10725 Cal. 2d at 423, 154 P.2d at 668.
100 People v. Wegner, 39 ll. 2d 28, 237 N.E.2d 486
(1968). Cf. Mosher v. LaVallee, 351 F. Supp. 1101,
1110 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
100 485 S.W.2d 424 (Mo. 1972).
"O Id. at 429. See State v. Rose, 440 S.W.2d 441
(Mo. 1969) (defense attorney); State v. Edmondson,
438 S.W.2d 237 (Mo. 1969) (judge); State v. Cochran,
332 Mo. 742, 60 S.W.2d 1 (1933) (prosecuting attorney).
See generally Note, A New Ground for Withdrawal of
Plea of Guilty: Plea Involuntarily Induced by Defend-
ant's Attorney. State v. Rose, 36 Mo. L. P~v. 139 (1971).
MSee United States ex rel. Elksnis v. Gilligan, 256
F. Supp. 244, 254, 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Common-
wealth v. Evans, 434 Pa. 52, 55-56, 252 A.2d 689, 690
(1969).
12The 1973 proposed amendments to the Federal
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state that it is not."' Still others have drawn a
distinction between the judge's participation during
negotiations and the judge's ratification after a
tentative settlement has been reached?' 4 The
conclusion to be drawn is that the law is in a state
of flui, and no accurate predictions can be made
without studying the law of the jurisdiction in
question.
The mishap more easily analyzed in this area is
that of the broken judicial promise. Statements by
the judge, in the form of plea negotiations, have
been said to fall under the same scrutiny as any
influence which might make a guilty plea in-
voluntary?' 5 Those cases which have extended
Sanlobello to cover judicial promises are more
properly concerned with plea bargaining mishaps,
rather than with a voluntariness test. An example
of. the first type of case, decided on voluntariness
grounds, is People v. Stephens,"8 in which the
judge participated in the plea discussions with the
defense attorney and the prosecutor. Although the
judge never actually issued a promise, his state-
ments of his inclinations in the matter were held
Rules of Criminal Procedure flatly bar the trial court
from participating in plea discussions. 8 J. MooRE,
FEDERA. PRACTxCE 11.05(5), at 11-109 (4th ed. 1966).
113 Brown v. Peyton, 435 F.2d 1352 (4th Cir. 1970);
Blackman v. State, 265 So. 2d 734, 735 (Fla. App.
1972); Commonwealth v. Rothman, 294 A.2d 783 (Pa.
Super. 1972); see generally Note, Criminal Procedure-
Plea Bargaining-Trial Juadgds Participation Does Not
Render Plea Involuntary, 24 VAND. L. Rxv. 836 (1971)
(note'on Brown).
In England, the judge must participate in the plea
discussion and agreement, if any. Thomas, Plea Bar-
gaining and the Turner Case, 1970 CRm. L. R.; 559,
563 (1970).
raThe American Bar Association recognized this
distinction in their recommendations, allowing for
judicial participation after the parties have reached a
tentative settlement, MInIM STANDARDS, supra
note 14, at 71-72, 74-76. Illinois has also recognized
the distinction, and although the "trial judge shall not
initiate plea discussions," ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 110,
§ 402 (d)(1) (1971), he may play an important part if
the parties come to him with a tentative agreement.
ILL. REv. STAT., ch. ll0a, § 402 (d)(2) (1971).
Case law has also drawn the line between participa-
tion and ratification. See, eg., United States ex rel.
Rosa v. Follette, 395 F.2d 721, 725 n.5 (2d Cir. 1968);
Commonwealth v. Evans, 434 Pa. 52, 252 A.2d 689,
691 n.* (1969); see also 8 DuQuEsNE L. REv. 461, 465-
466 (1970) (note on Evans); see generally Comment,
Judicial Participation in Guilty Pleas-A Search for
Standards, 33 U. Pirr. L. Rv. 151 (1971). But see
Brown v. Peyton, 435 F.2d 1352, 1356 (4th Cir. 1970)
(court rejects ABA distinction); cf. United States ex
rel. Elksnis v. Gilligan, 256 F. Supp. 244 (S.D.N.Y.
1966); United States v. Tateo, 214 F. Supp. 560
(S.D.N.Y. 1963).
n'I Brown v. Peyton, 435 F.2d 1352, 1356 (4th Cir.
1970) (applying the Brady tests of involuntariness).
M1 45 Mich. App. 689, 206 N.W.2d 757 (1973).
to be improper inducement in light of the fact that
he gave a higher sentence than expected."7 People
v. Riebem is an example of the Santobello "fairness"
test. In Riebe the Illinois supreme court held that
judicial statements during plea discussion were
tantamount to promises which must be fulfilled.
In the case of an express promise, courts have held
that "the imposition by the judge of a sentence
contrary to his express promise is wholly irrec-
oncilable with constitutional safeguards and due
process of law." u9 Where the judge makes a
promise and reneges, courts are likely to extend
the rationale of Santobello.no
One final mishap occurs where the prosecutor
issues a promise and the defendant pleads guilty,
but the sentence is twice that bargained for be-
cause the judge refused to go along with the agree-
ment. This is certainly an injurious mishap, but it
cannot be collaterally attacked if the judge has
given no prior indication of accepting the agree-
ment. A Presidential Commission felt that this
problem would seldom arise,"' but in fact, it
frequently does. As noted in People v. Hancasky,12
"It is elementary that a court is not bound by the
recommendation of a State's Attorney.... ,23
In People v. Baldridge"m an agreement was reached,
but prior to sentencing the trial judge informed
the defendant that he was in no way bound by
any recommendations or promises. On appeal, the
Illinois supreme court held that the prosecutor had
fulfilled his promise by recommending the agreed
upon sentence. The fact that the trial judge refused
to go along was held to give the defendant no
grounds for relief. The plea was held not to have
been made in reliance upon the judge's consent
since the defendant had notice of the judge's
sentiments.
1 Id. at 760.
I' 40 Ill. 2d 565, 241 N.E.2d 313 (1968).
n9 United States ex rd. Elksnis v. Gilligan, 256 F.
Supp. 244, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
"I People v. Craig, 41 App. Div. 2d 932, 343 N.Y.S.
2d 365 (1973).
121 TASK FoRcE, supra note 48, at 11.
410 Ill. 148, 101 N.E.2d 575 (1951).
"'Id. at 155, 101 N.E.2d at 579. See Gallegos v.
United States, 466 F.2d 740, 741 (5th Cir. 1972);
People v. Williams, 10 Ill. App. 3d 456, 458, 294
N.E.2d 98, 100 (1973); People v. Cheshier, 3 Ill. App.
3d 523, 525, 278 N.E.2d 93, 94 (1972); Lambert v.
State, - S.C. -, __, 198 S.E.2d 118, 119-120 (1973).
See generally TASK FoRce, supra note 48, at 10; Davis,
The Guilty Plea Process: Exploring the Issues of Volun-
tariness and Accuracy, 6 VAL. U. L. REv. 111, 116
(1972); Comment, Plea Bargaining-Justice Off the
Record, 9 WAsHBUPN L. J. 430, 431 (1970).
"'19 Ill. 2d 616, 169 N.E.2d 353 (1960).
COMMENT
The American Bar Association has recommended
that the judge, prior to sentencing, and at the
request of the parties, determine the terms of any
agreement and then state his predisposition to
them." 5 He should also inform the defendant that
he is not bound by the deal."26 This procedure
would eliminate what one commentator has called
the "ritualistic, minstrel dance" 1 of hiding the
agreement.
Illinois has adopted this procedure in Supreme
Court Rule 402.12 Any agreement must be stated
in open court and the judge must confirm the
terms of the agreement.129 Upon request of either
party, a tentative agreement may be presented to
the judge at the pre-arraignment stage. He may
then give his predisposition. If he agrees, he may
not change his mind without allowing the de-
fendant the opportunity to withdraw the guilty
plea. If the defendant does withdraw his plea, the
judge is to recuse himself."10 Many of these pro-
cedures have been developed by case law in other
jurisdictions."'
12 MINJUUM STANDARDs, supra note 14, at 29. In
West Virginia, it is mandatory that any plea agreement
be made part of the record. State ex rel. Clancy v.
Coiner, 179 S.E.2d 726 (W. Va. 1971). Cf. Note,
Criminal Law-Plea Bargaining-Withdrawal of
Guilty Plea, 74 W. VA. L. REv. 196, 199-200 (1972).
126 MnmqM STANmARDs, supra note 14, at 29.
"'Davis, The Guilty Plea Process: Exploring the
Issues of Voluntariness and Accuracy, 6 VA. U. L.
REv. 111, 119 (1972). The author continues, explain-
ing the process which works to keep secret the bargain.
Id. at 119-120.
The then Attorney General of Wyoming expressed
the opinion that more extensive, more open pretrial
procedures (like discovery and pretrial conferences)
would help the criminal justice system by making
convictions harder to attack. Raper, Post Conviction
Remedies, 19 Wyo. L.J. 213 (1965).
2 ILL. R v. STAT., ch. 110a, § 402 (1971).
"2 ILL. REy. STAT., ch. 110a, § 402(b) (1971).
30 ILL. REv. STAT., ch. l0a, § 402(d)(2) (1971).
1I See Enos v. State, 272 So. 2d 847, 850 (Fla. App.
1973); Dube v. State, - Ind. -, 275 N.E.2d 7, 11
(1971); Dodson v. Page, 461 P.2d 957 (Okla. Cr. App.
1969). Cf. Comment, Criminal Law: Plea Withdrawal
in Oklahoma, 23 OKLA. L. REv. 472, 475 (1970) (citing
and discussing Dobson).
The Illinois Rule further requires that if the
parties do not request such a hearing, the judge
shall inform the defendant in open court that he is
not bound by any agreement and that the disposi-
tion of the case may differ from any promise made
to the defendant. 32 If the defendant persists in
his plea he is said to have pleaded independently
of the promise of the prosecutor."' If at any
juncture the judge does not follow the Supreme
Court Rule and the defendant finds himself the
victim of a mishap, he may seek and obtain col-
lateral relief.
These procedures will eliminate much of the
post-conviction filing in plea bargaining mishap
situations if scrupulously followed. One problem
may arise, however, as this rule is put into effect.
Its practice may become more and more routine,
and someday in the future, it may also resemble a
"minstrel dance." Just as today, a negative reply
to the "threats and promise" question has become
a formality, the rule-dictated judicial warning
that the judge is not bound may soon be merely
proforma. If this does occur, it should not be con-
sidered conclusive and courts should be urged
to look beyond it, to see if the defendant is a
hopeless victim of an undue plea bargaining mis-
hap.
CONCLUSION
It has been the goal of this comment to catalogue
the law concerning the possibility of collaterally
attacking plea bargaining mishaps. Some of the
mishaps give rise to remedies; others do not. This
survey is by no means exhaustive, but was in-
tended to raise the major issues which arise in this
confusing, "pseudo-contractual" area of criminal
law.
1" IT. REv. STAT., ch. ll0a, § 402(d)(2) (1971).
"'See People v. Baron, 130 Ill. App. 2d 588, 264
N.E.2d 423 (1970); People v. Baldridge, 19 Ill. 2d 616,
169 N.E.2d 353 (1960). Cf. Cross v. State, 248 Ark.
553, 452 S.W.2d 854 (1970).
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DISCOVERY IN CRIMINAL CASES: DENIAL TO MISDEMEANANTS AS A
VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION
On October 1, 1971, Illinois Supreme Court Rules
411, 412 and 4151 became effective. These liberal
discovery2 rules superceded previous Illinois stat-
utes regarding discovery and granted extensive
discovery rights to criminal defendants. ' The appli-
cability of these rules, however, was limited to
"criminal cases wherein the accused is charged
with an offense for which, upon conviction, he
might be imprisoned in the penitentiary." 4
Prior to the enactment of the new Illinois dis-
covery rules the Supreme Court of Illinois had
held that a defendant, charged with a misde-
meanor, was entitled to the discovery of a police
report prepared by the sole prosecution witness.'
Subsequent to the enactment of the new discovery
rules, however, an Illinois appellate court, in
People v. Schmidt,8 held that Supreme Court Rule
1 fri. REv. STAT. ch. 110A, §§ 411, 412 &415 (1971).
IL. Rsv. STAT. ch. 110A, §§ 413 &414 (1971) dealwith
prosecutorial discovery and evidence depositions,
respectively.
2Discovery and pre-trial discovery are used inter-
changeably in this comment. Disclosure, when used,
refers to disclosure at time of trial.
3 The superceded Illinois statutes were fI.. R V.
STAT. ch. 38, §§ 114-9, 114-10 & 114-13 (1968). These
sections were vague and primarily gave authority to the
Illinois Supreme Court to promulgate rules of discovery.
To this effect, § 114-13 read that "[D]iscovery pro-
cedures in criminal cases shall be in accordance with
Supreme Court Rules." §§ 114-9 and 114-10 dealt
with motions for a list of witnesses and to produce a
confession, respectively.
4 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110A, § 411 (1971). In Illinois,
felony is defined as "an offense punishable with death
or by imprisonment in the penitentiary .... " IL.. REv.
STAT. ch. 38, § 2-7 (1971). A misdemeanor is "any
offense other than a felony, and includes conduct pro-
hibited by a statute which provides no penalty for its
violation." ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 2-11 (1971).
5 People v. Allen, 47 111. 2d 57,264 N.E.2d 184 (1970).
The defendant based his claim on an asserted denial of
due process of law in that he was deprived of his full
right to cross examine the witness and his right to
possibly impeach the witness. The court, however, side-
stepped the issue and relied on "a right sense of justice"
as the basis for this rule of production. Id. at 59, 264
N.E.2d at 185. Accord, People v. Cole, 30 Ill. 2d 375,
196 N.E.2d 691 (1964); People v. Moses, 11 Ill. 2d
84, 142 N.E.2d 1 (1957).
More recent decisions in Illinois rely more directly
on due process as a basis for requiring discovery. People
v. Flowers, 51 IIl. 2d 25, 281 N.E.2d 299 (1972);
People v. Cagle, 41 Ill. 2d 528, 244 N.E.2d 200 (1969);
People v. Crawford, 114 Ill. App. 2d 230, 252 N.E.2d
483 (1969).
'8 Ill. App. 3d 1024, 291 N.E.2d 225 (1972).
18
411 limited the applicability of the discovery rules
to felonies and therefore denied the defendant who
was charged with driving while intoxicated, a mis-
demeanor, discovery of a police report.7 Liberaliza-
tion of the law had resulted in loss of rights for the
class of criminals known as misdemeanants, whose
cases comprise the vast majority of criminal
cases presently before state courts.
8
The explicit denial of discovery in misdemeanor
cases is unique to Illinois, but the potential for
similar adjudications based on statutory interpre-
tation exists in other jurisdictions. Arizona, for
example, provides for automatic discovery "no
later than 10 days after arraignment in Superior
Court...." I Since an accused misdemeanant by
statute, may not be arraigned in the superior court
the statute could be interpreted as denying dis-
covery in misdemeanor cases."
This comment is concerned with the constitu-
tionality of the denial of discovery in misdemeanor
cases and, more generally, the constitutionality of
the misdemeanor/felony dichotomy as a standard
for the allocation of rights and privileges to crimi-
nal defendants. In order to deal more fully with
the specific question of misdemeanant's discovery
rights, the first section of this comment will analyze
The factual situations in Allen and Schmidt are very
similar, with the sole difference being that Allen was
charged with resisting arrest in addition to the common
charge of driving while intoxicated. Resisting arrest is
'also a misdemeanor in Illinois. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 31-1 (1971).8 Hellerstein, The Importance of the Misdemeanor
Case on Trial and Appeal, 38 TnE LEGAL Am Bzxar-
cASE 151 (1970).
9 AmZ. R. Cam. P. 15.1 (1973).
10 ARiz. R. CRw. P. 14.1(c) (1973), provides that an
arraignment need not be held in cases involving offenses
triable in a non-record court. Misdemeanors are triable
in non-record courts. Amz. R. Cmr. P. 2.1(b) (1973).
It should be noted that misdemeanor actions may also
be commenced in Superior Court. A=z. R. Cmx. P.
2.1(a) (1973).
Montana's discovery statute also has limited applica-
bility. MoNT. R V. CoDEs ANn. § 95-1803 (1959),
provides that discovery is available "[]n all criminal
cases originally triable in District Court .... " However,
in Montana, justice's courts have jurisdiction of all
misdemeanors punishable by a fine not exceeding
$500.00 or imprisonment not exceeding six months or
both. MoNT. REv. Conas ANN. § 95-302 (1959). The
district court has jurisdiction of all public offenses not
otherwise provided for. MoxT. R v. Con s ANN.
§ 95-301 (1959).
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arguments that the sixth and fourteenth amend-
ments incorporate the right to discovery.
The second section will discuss the denial of
discovery in termsof the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. The position that such a
denial constitutes a violation of fundamental fair-
ness as required by the due process clause is based
on the premise that the constitution incorporates
a-right to discovery. Although the arguments that
discovery is constitutionally required are compel-
ling, no court has ever held that such a constitu-
ti6nal right exists.I Regardless of whether a constitutional basis for
discovery exists, many states have recognized the
importance of discovery by enacting statutory pro-
visions for discovery?' The third section posits the
argument that where such statutes exist, the denial
of discovery solely on the ground that an accused
is" charged with a misdemeanor is a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
I
Discovery had its origins in the English Courts
of Chancery.' 2 Rex v. Holland,I in 1792, first dealt
with the issue of criminal discovery and flatly
refused to allow it, holding that there was no prin-
ciple or precedent to warrant it and that the court
was without discretionary power to grant it. Lord
Kenyon, Chief Justice, thought that discovery
would subvert the whole system of criminal law.14
In America, the issue of criminal discovery was
presented early in the trial of former Vice President
Aaron Burr on conspiracy and treason charges.' 5
1Anx. STAT. ANN. § 43-2011.2 (Supr. 1973); MONT.
Rliv. CODES ANN. § 95-1803 (1959); N. C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15.155.4 (Strpp. 1971); Omo REv. CODE § 2945.50
(1971); TENN. CoDE ANN. § 40-2441 (Sun,. 1970);
Tx. CODE CRIM. P. § 39.14 (1966); W. VA. CODE
§ 62-1B-1 to 62-lB-4 (1970); Wis. ANN. STAT. § 971.23
(1957).
Asiz. R. Cpai. P. 15.1 (1973); COLO. R. Csur. P.
16 (1963); DEL. SUrnR. CT. (CRim.) R. 16 (1953);
FLA. R. CnRm. P. 1.220 (1968); Ky. R. CRum. P. 7.24
(1971); MD. R. P. 728 (1957); PA. R. Cnn. P. 310
(Supp. 1973).
Judicial decisions form the basis for discovery in
California, New Hampshire and Washington. E.g.,
Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P.2d 919,
22 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1962); State v. Superior Court, 106
N.H. 228, 208 A.2d 832 (1965); State v. Johnson, 28
N.J. 133, 145 A.2d 313 (1958); State v. Thompson, 54
Wash. 2d 100, 338 P.2d 319 (1959).
12 9 HOLISWORM, HISTORY or ENGLISH LAW 330408
(3d ed. 1944); Gaynor, Defendant's Right of Discovery
in Crininal Cases, 20 Cmv. ST. L. REv. 3 (1971).
15100 Eng. Rep. 1248 (K. B. 1792).
1
4 Id. at 1249.
1525 Fed. Cas. 30 (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
In holding that a letter from Thomas Jefferson,
which was relevant to the defense could not be
withheld, Chief justice Marshall set an important
precedent for criminal discovery that was ignored
for over one hundred years.
The English rule prohibiting discovery in crimi-
nal cases was adhered to in most American juris-
dictions.' 6 judge Learned Hand's well known ob-
servation in United States v. GarssonX is indicative
of the judicial attitude toward pre-trial discovery
in criminal cases:
It [discovery] is said to lie in discretion, and perhaps
it does, but no judge of this court has granted it,
and I hope none ever will. Under our criminal pro-
cedure the accused has every advantage. While the
prosecution is held rigidly to the charge, he need
not disclose the barest outline of his defense. He is
immune from question or comment on his silence;
he cannot be convicted when there is the least
fair doubt in the minds of any one of the twelve.
Why in addition he should in advance have the
whole evidence against him to pick over at his
leisure, and make his defense, fairly or foully, I
have never been able to see.18
Four years later, in 1927, Mr. Justice Cardozo,
while sitting on the Court of Appeals of New York;
professed to see the "beginnings or at least the
glimmerings of " 19 a doctrine of inherent power in
the criminal courts to compel discovery.
Since 1927, discovery has gained more and more
support. Numerous jurisdictions have passed dis-
covery statutes." Many states without statutory
discovery rely on judicially created discover
rights.2l Although there is still disagreement over
the extent to which discovery should be afforded
to criminal defendants, the general trend in Ameri-
can jurisdictions has been toward the granting,
16 Se e.g., United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646
(S.D.N.Y. 1923); Wendling v. Commonwealth, 143
Ky. 587, 137 S.W. 205 (1911); Robertson v. Steele, 117
Minn. 384, 135 N.W. 1128 (1912); State v. Tune, 13
N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881 (1953); Territory v. McFarlane,
7 N.M. 421, 37 P. 1111 (1894); Santry v. State, 67 Wis.
65, 30 N.W. 226 (1886).
17 291 F. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
8 Id. at 649.
" People ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court, 245 N.Y.
24, 32, 156 N.E. 84, 86 (1927). Although justice
Cardozo professed to see the glimmerings of a doctrine
of criminal discovery, he denied such a request in the
case at bar. The decision is based on the theory that if
the evidence is not admissible in court, it is not subject
to inspection. Since the items, documents and memo-
randa in the possession of the district attorney were
held inadmissible, discovery was denied.
21 See note 10 supra.
21 See cases cited in note 10 supra.
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either legislatively or judicially, of liberal discovery
rights." The rationale for granting broad discovery
rights is important in determining the constitu-
tional validity of the misdemeanor/felony distinc-
tion. Although the misdemeanor/felony dichotomy
may be constitutionally invalid, whether discovery
is constitutionally mandated or state created, the
constitutional arguments for attacking this di-
chotomy will vary depending on the basis for pre-
trial discovery.
With the trend toward more liberalized criminal
discovery there has been greater recognition of a
constitutional basis for discovery." The Supreme
Court has not spoken directly to the issue of a
constitutional basis for discovery but the Court
has implied several approaches. Mooney v. Holo-
hane marked the beginning of a line of cases that
can be seen to be laying the framework for the
argument that discovery is incorporated into the
fourteenth amendment. The use of the due process
rationale focuses on the concept that due process,
in safeguarding the liberty of the citizen against
deprivation through the action of the State, em-
bodies the fundamental conceptions of justice
which lie at the base of our civil and political in-
stitutions.
2
2 See note 10 supra. Traditional arguments against
pre-trial discovery have been that pretrial discovery
would increase the dangers of intimidation of witnesses,
elimination or alteration of documentary evidence,
perjury and subornation of perjury. See United States
v. Gleason, 265 F. Supp. 880 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); State
v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881 (1953). See also
Krantz, Pre-Trial Discovery in Criminal Cases: A
Necessity for Fair and Impartial Justice, 42 NEB. L.
Rav. 127 (1962) [hereinafter Krantz]; Nakell, Criminal
Discovery for the Defense and the Prosecution-The
Developing Constitutional Considerations, 50 N.C. L.
REv. 437 (1972) [hereinafter Nakell].
2An excellent analysis of the constitutional con-
siderations for discovery is presented in Nakell, supra
note 22. See also, Fahringer, Has Anyone Here Seen
Brady?: Discovery in Criminal Cases, 9 CRa. L. BuLL.
325 (1973) [hereinafter Faringer]; Symposium, Criminal
Discovery, 7 U.S.F.L. REv. 203 (1973). General over-
views of discovery, illustrative of the liberalizing trend
in criminal discovery can be seen in Brennan, The
Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth,
1963 WAsn. U.L.Q. 279 (1963); Fletcher, Pre-Trial
Discovery in State Criminal Cases, 12 STAz. L.R. 293
(1960); Gaynor, The Defendant's Right to Discovery in
Criminal Cases, 20 CLEv. ST. L. Rav. 3 (1971); Gold-
stein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage
in Criminal Prosecutions, 69 YAlE L.J. 1149 (1960);
Katz, Pre-Trial Discovery in Criminal Cases, 5 Cnms L.
BuLL. 441 (1969); Krantz, note 23 supra; Rezneck,
Justice Brennan and Discovery in Criminal Cases, 4
RuT. Cjm. L.J. 85 (1972); Traynor, Ground Lost and
Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 228
(1964).
24 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
In Mooney, the Court held that the state's know-
ing use of perjured testimony was "inconsistent
with the rudimentary demands of justice ... ,, 26
The Court, in Pyle v. Kansas," affirmed and
slightly extended Mooney. In Pyle, the defendant
alleged that the prosecutor knowingly used per-
jured testimony and suppressed evidence favorable
to the defendant. Such allegations were held to be
sufficient to allege a deprivation of due process and
the lower court could not deny a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus without determining the truth
of the allegations.
In Alcorta v. Texas2s and Napue v. Illinois," the
Court extended the concepts of fundamental fair-
ness inherent in the due process clause to situa-
tions where the state did not solicit false evidence,
but allowed it to go uncorrected with the knowl-
edge that it was false. Moreover, the Court held,
in Napue, that suppression of evidence favorable
to the defense was a denial of due process."0
The preceding cases led to the holding in Brady v.
Maryland' that:
the suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due
process where the evidence is material either to
guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good
faith or bad faith of the prosecution."
Mooney, Pyle, Alcorta, Napue and Brady were all
variations on the same theme: that suppression of
evidence by the prosecution was, under certain
circumstances, a violation of due process. The
corollary, in those situations where suppression is
violative of due process rights, is that disclosure,
in those situations, is required. 3 However, dis-
closure, referring to disclosure at the time of trial,
does not alleviate the problems inherent in the
adequate and proper preparation of a defense.'
Nonetheless, the above mentioned cases did not
purport to require pre-trial discovery, and only
prohibited suppression of evidence by the prose-
cution at the time of trial.
25 Id. at 112.
26Id. at 112.
- 317 U.S. 213 (1942).
355 U.S. 28 (1957).
" 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
30 Id. at 269.
31373 U.S. 83 (1963).
2 Id. at 87.
"Nakell at 452.
4Gaining the evidence at the time of trial does not
afford defense counsel the same opportunity to assimi-




Brady and its precursors are predicated on the
concept that the due process clause requires funda-
mental fairness in the judicial process. This con-
cept is, in turn, predicated on the growing realiza-
tion that the average criminal defendant is at a
serious disadvantage, as compared to the state, in
the ability to gather evidence due to a lack of
manpower and resources. In addition, the police,
in the usual course of investigating the crime, will
have removed, and in some cases obliterated, evi-
dence before the defendant is actually charged
with the crime, making the defendant dependent
on the prosecutor for needed evidence. 5
The impact of this weakness in the adversary
system of justice is made dearer by viewing it in
terms of the purposes of the adversary process. In
the American system of criminal justice, "[tihe
purpose of a trial is as much the acquittal of an
innocent person as it is the conviction of a guilty
one." 11 A basic tenet of the criminal justice system
is that a person is innocent until he has had a fair
opportunity to prepare a defense and is then proven
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
The police, in their position as impartial en-
forcers of the law, should conduct an investigation
that is impartial with a goal toward ascertaining
the truth.3 Ascertainment of the truth is also the
goal of the prosecutor, not the compilation of "a
record of indiscriminate convictions by conceal-
ment and surprise." 38 Furthermore, it has been
noted that:
[Tihe State has no interest in interposing any
obstacle to the disclosure of the facts, unless it is
interested in convicting accused parties on the
testimony of untrustworthy persons.n
11 Fahringer, note 23 supra; Nakell, note 22 supra.
36Application of Kapatos, 208 F. Supp. 883, 888
(S.D.N.Y. 1962).
17 According to Fahringer, note 23 supra, at 326,
"investigation of crime should be designed not only to
convict the guilty but to free the innocent."
38 Krantz, note 22 supra, at 130. See also Giles v.
Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 98 (1967)(Fortas, J., dissent-
ing); Jackson v. Wainwright, 390 F.2d 288 (5th Cir.
1968). In Jackson, judge Wisdom cites Canon 5 of the
American Bar Association Code of Professional Ethics
for the proposition that:
The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public
prosecution is not to convict, but to see that justice
is done.
Id. at 294.
39 People v. Moses, 11 Ill. 2d 84, 89, 142 N.E.2d 1,
3 (1957), quoting from People v. Davis, 52 Mich. 569,
573, 18 N.W. 362, 363 (1884). See also Jones v. Superior
Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P.2d 919, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879
(1962).
Since in practice the prosecution is likely to be
in possession of the evidence that is essential for
the adequate and proper preparation of a defense,
and no prosecutorial or state interest in withhold-
ing such evidence exists, there appears to be no
reason for denying discovery. In fact, the Supreme
Court has observed,
that disclosure, rather than suppression, of relevant
materials ordinarily promotes the proper adminis-
tration of justice.4'
Although the thrust of Brady is directed toward
maintaining the fundamental fairness in the ju-
dicial process and rights guaranteed by the Federal
Constitution, Brady left important questions un-
answered and imposed a limitation on what evi-
dence had to be disclosed to the defense. The Court
had an opportunity to propound a doctrine of
constitutionally required pre-trial discovery under
the fourteenth amendment but stopped short of
this result. Since the Court, in Brady, made no
explicit reference to pre-trial discovery, various
courts have subsequently held that Brady "did not
deal in any way with pre-trial discovery by the
defendant," 4 1 but, rather, dealt only with fairness
at trial and not before. Second, the Brady Court
limited the holding to evidence that was material
and favorable. Recently, the Supreme Court has
reiterated this portion of the holding.4" Third,
Brady did not indicate who was to make the deter-
mination as to the favorability of the evidence. In
subsequent cases, courts have held that the deter-
mination is for the trial court subject to appellate
review.3 Additionally, Brady was limited by its
facts to felony cases.
41 Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 870 (1966).4
1 United States v. Armantrout, 278 F. Supp. 517, 518
(S.D.N.Y. 1968). In United States v. Manhattan Brush
Co., 38 F.R.D. 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), the court held that
Brady applies tests of fairness to the prosecution at
trial and not before. The court said further that there
was no intention in Brady, of creating pre-trial dis-
covery rights. Id. at 6-7. See also United States v.
Gleason, 265 F. Supp. 880 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). Judge
Frankel argued that there should not be a blanket
denial of pre-trial discovery although in the case at bar
discovery was denied. The reason for the denial was
that the evidence sought was not novel or unexpected
and there was no compelling reason to allow pre-trial
discovery.
42 Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972).4
1 In United States v. Jordan, 399 F.2d 610, 615 (2d
Cir. 1968), the Court, responding to defendant's con-
tention that defense counsel should determine what
evidence is favorable to the defendant, concluded that
the trial court is to make the decision, subject to appel-
late review. Compare Jordan sith United States v.
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The implication in Brady, that the defense is
not entitled to unfavorable evidence, ignores the
fact that such evidence is necessary towards the
adequate preparation of a defense. In attempting
to ascertain the truth about a given incident it
seems anomalous to withhold evidence obtained
in investigations conducted pursuant to the goal of
ascertaining the truth. The denial of pre-trial dis-
covery and rejection of the contention that such
discovery is essential to obtain full protection of
the due process clause leads to the illogical con-
clusion that the trier of fact can fairly determine
what actually happened without knowledge of
all the pertinent facts. The prosecutor should not
be required to make the defendant's case, but
fundamental fairness and the concept of the ad-
versary system require that defendant's counsel
have the pertinent information with which to build
his own case.
Denying the defense the opportunity to deter-
mine the favorability or materiality of the evi-
dence is also inconsistent with fundamental fair-
ness and the precepts of an adversary system.
Neither the prosecutor nor the trial court have
the same motive, personal interest or drive in pre-
senting a defense as does defense counsel and, con-
sequently, are il-suited to make the necessary
evidentiary determinations. The public demand
for high conviction rates puts pressure on the prose-
cutors to strive for convictions and encourages the
suppression of evidence. Although public pressure
is unlikely to affect the trial court, the court lacks
the sensitivity and familiarity with a case neces-
sary for a full appreciation of the evidence pos-
sessed by the prosecutor, so is no substitute for
defense participation in making the determination.
Although there are compelling arguments against
the direct and indirect limitations of Brady and
for constitutionally required discovery, subsequent
case law has left little doubt as to the attitude of
the courts."4 Cases after Brady reject the theory
Manhattan Brush Co., 38 F.R.D. 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)
(government obligations must be examined and tested
after trial). Contra, Fahringer, note 22 supra, at 330:
This difficult judgment process should properly be
left to the singlemindedness of defense counsel....
No one but defense counsel should be trusted with
this decision.
4See notes 39, 40 & 41 supra. See also Wardius v.
Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973) (without deciding whether
discovery in itself is required by due process, the Su-
preme Court held that where there is prosecutorial dis-
covery there must be defense discovery). See also
Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P.2d 919,22
Cal. Rptr. 879 (1962). Other courts seem to support a
theory that denial of discovery can result in violation
that Brady is a constitutional discovery case and
have reaffirmed the limitations of Brady. Most re-
cently, the United States Supreme Court, in Moore
v. .Ilinois, 5 strictly reinforced the limitation of
defense discovery to favorable evidence. The Court
held that the state's failure to disclose favorable
evidence that would have seriously impeached a
prosecution witness' identification of thedefendant
was not sufficient to support a claim of a violation
of a Brady right. The Court's reasoning was that
since the misidentification was by only one wit-
ness and was not material to the issue of guilt or
innocence in light of all the evidence, it did not
meet the Brady standards.
The cases after Brady have scrutinized the
Brady decision and have carefully refrained from
reading anything into the holding, that is not ap-
parent on its face. Such strict, scrutiny has re-
stricted the holding to a prosecutorial admonition
against suppression of evidence. Although subject
to reinterpretation, Brady presently does. not
support the position that discovery is required by
the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
meat.
Additional constitutional implications for pre-
trial discovery can be drawn from other applica-
tions of the due process clause and the sixth
amendment. In Roviaro v. United States,4" the
Supreme Court applied fundamental due process
analysis in holding that the government's privilege
to withhold the identity of an informer must fall
when,
disclosure of an informer's identity, or of the con-
tents of his communication, is relevant and helpful
to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair
determination of a cause.... 4
Although Roviaro deals with a testimonial
privilege and the limitations placed on its use by
the due process clause, and the holding is primarily
directed toward disclosure during the trial, the
Court deemed it necessary to add that the trial
court also erred in denying defendant's pre-trial
motion for a bill of particulars requesting the
identity and address of the informer." Roviaro
of due process rights. In such situations due process
would require pre-trial discovery. People v. Flowers,
51 Ill. 2d 25, 281 N.E.2d 299 (1972); People v. Cagle,
41 Ill. 2d 528, 244 N.E.2d 200 (1969).
4 408 U.S. 786 (1972).
46353 U.S. 53 (1957).47 Id. at 60-61. See also Honore v. Superior Court,
70 Cal. 2d 162,449 P.2d 169,74 Cal. Rptr.'233 (1969).
48 353 U.S. 53, 65 n.15.
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thus implies a constitutional basis for at least one
specific area of pre-trial discovery-the identity
and address of an informer.49 Roviaro also is sig-
nificant because it adopted the standard that the
evidence in question be relevant and helpful, a less
strict standard than the material and favorable
standard of Brady. Furthermore, Roviaro in-
volved the disclosure of inculpatory evidence which
presumably would not now be discoverable under
the Brady standard. 50
The sixth amendment right to counsel has also
provided sustenance to the theory of the consti-
tutional incorporation of discovery. In United
States v. Wade," the Court-held that the sixth and
fourteenth amendments require counsel to be
present at a pre-trial lineup since such a lineup is a
critical stage in the proceedings. The importance
of the holding to pre-trial discovery lies in the fact
that the Court recognized that a pre-trial lineup
is an important vehicle for discovery. Defense
counsel's presence will enable him to obtain evi-
dence with which to attack the fairness of the
lineup and the validity of both in-court and out-of-
court identifications plus information with which
to attack the credibility of the government's
witnesses without "having to probe in the dark
in an attempt to discover and reveal unfair-
n e s s . .. . ,, 52
More recently, the Court, in Coleman v. Ala-
bama,n held that the preliminary hearing was a
critical stage of Alabama's criminal procedure and
therefore the sixth amendment right to counsel
was applicable to such a situation. The Court's
determination that a preliminary hearing was a
critical stage partially rests on the recognition that
it is extremely important for the purpose of pre-
trial discovery."
49 There is also the obvious relationship with the
sixth amendment in Roviaro-the right to be confronted
with the witnesses against you. See James v. State,
493 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973). Taking a
somewhat contrary view is Hewitt & Bell, Beyond Rule
16: The Inherent Power of the Federal Court to Order Pre-
Trial Discovery in Criminal Cases, 7 U.S.F. L. Rlv.
233 (1973).
10 The identity of the informer and his testimony are
dearly inculpatory. Illinois courts, even prior to the
adoption of the new discovery rules, allowed discovery
of inculpatory evidence. E.g., People v. Allen, 47 Il.
2d 57, 264 N.E.2d 184 (1970); People v. Tribbett, 90
fl1. App. 2d 296,232 N.E.2d 523 (1967).
61388 U.S. 218 (1967).
62 Id. at 240-41.
51399 U.S. 1 (1970).
4 Id. at 9. The Court recognized that the preliminary
hearing would enable the defense to obtain evidence
with which to impeach the state's witnesses and would
The impact of Coleman is severely limited by the
fact that there is no guarantee of a preliminary
hearing since a'grand jury proceeding may be held
instead. 5 Since the defense attorney would not be
present, he would lose an important discovery tool.
Furthermore, the concept that discovery is an
important purpose of a preliminary hearing has
been diluted by decisions holding that the judge
may terminate a preliminary hearing as soon as
there is a showing of probable cause, thus limiting
discovery to whatever evidence the prosecutor has
obtained up to that point in time 9
The presumption of innocence and proof of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt have also been relied
on as authority for the existence of a constitutional
right of discovery. Mr. Justice Brennan twice has
said, in favor of discovery,
To shackle counsel so that they cannot effectively
seek out the truth and afford the accused the repre-
sentation which is not his privilege but his absolute
right, seriously imperils our bedrock presumption
of innocence.P
Mr. Justice Brennan first argues that discovery
is necessary to make the right to counsel more than
a meaningless gesture. The deprivation of dis-
covery relates to the very foundation of our legal
system-the presumption of innocence. Discovery
is the vehicle for enforcing proof beyond a reason-
able doubt and making the presumption of inno-
cence meaningful.
Presently, the overwhelming weight of authority
forces the conclusion that despite compelling argu-
ments for constitutionally required discovery,
such a position has not been judicially accepted.,
There are still echoes of Judge Learned Hand's
opinion in Garsson lingering in the background.59
also afford an opportunity for discovering the state's
case.
6 E.g., Sciortino v. Zampano, 385 F.2d 132 (2d Cir.
1967); Crump v. Anderson, 352 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir.
1965). The preliminary hearing is for the purpose of
finding probable cause. If an indictment is returned,
probable cause is established and the need for a pre-
liminary hearing is eliminated. Grand jury proceedings
are secret, held without counsel present and merely
involve the presentation of prosecution evidence. Some
states provide for mandatory preliminary hearings.
E.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38 §§ 109-1 & 109-3 (1971).
6 Coleman v. Burnett, 477 F.2d 1187 (D.C. Cir.
1973). In Coleman, the court held that discovery was
not the purpose of a preliminary hearing.
57 State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 234, 98 A.2d 881, 897
(1953) [Brennan, J., dissenting opinion]; Brennan, The
Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?,
1963 WAsn. U.L.Q. 279, 287 (1963).
8 See notes 39, 40 & 41 supra.
69 See text accompanying note 18 supra.
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Proponents of discovery still have to fend off
attacks alleging that discovery will lead to perjury,
subornation of witnesses, fabrications, suppression
of evidence and will give the defendant too great
an advantage in the adversary system."' At the
same time, prosecutorial discovery is overcoming
fifth amendment self incrimination objections.a
Since the fifth amendment does not bar prosecu-
toria] discovery and many states provide for such
discovery by statute, complete discovery for the
defense becomes essential to maintain a fair balance
between the state and the defendant in the adver-
sarial process.
Whether or not discovery is constitutionally re-
quired, discovery rights, in varying degrees, are
accorded to defendants either by statute or by
judge-made law." Some statutes preclude discovery
in misdemeanor cases." Irrespective of whether
discovery is incorporated within the sixth or
fourteenth amendment, or whether it remains as
a constitutionally unprotected doctrine based on
equitable principles and concepts of a "right sense
of justice," 6, a strong case can be made that the
denial of discovery in misdemeanor cases, at least
where discovery is permitted in felony cases,
violates the due process and equal protection
clauses of the fourteenth amendment.
If discovery is viewed as being constitutionally
mandated, a strong argument can be made for the
position that the denial of discovery would be a
violation of due process of law and fundamental
fairness. In the past, certain constitutional rights
have been perfunctorily denied on the basis of the
misdemeanor/felony dichotomy. In Gideon v.
Wainwright," the Supreme Court held that an
indigent defendant is entitled to the appointment
of counsel to insure a fair trial. Although the de-
10 See note 22 supra. These objections are by no
means relics of a by-gone era. These objections were
raised in United States v. Manhattan Brush Co., 38
F.R.D. 4, 7 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
11 Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973); Williams
v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970). For the position that
prosecutorial discovery does violate fifth amendment
protections see Judge Peter's dissenting opinion in
Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P.2d 919,
22 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1962).
62 See note 10 supra.
6See note 9 supra.
6People v. Allen, 47 Ill. 2d 57, 264 N.E.2d 184
(1970); People v. Cole, 30 Ill. 2d 375, 196 N.E.2d 691
(1964); People v. Moses, 11 Ill. 2d 84, 142 N.E.2d 1
(1957).
65 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
cision was not limited in application to felonies,
subsequent decisions upheld the denial of
appointed counsel in misdemeanor cases." These
cases and analogous ones dealing with the right to
trial by jury developed the misdemeanor/felony
dichotomy and sought to formulate what was
hoped to be a more acceptable dichotomy-petty/
serious."
After Gideon, there were several judicial at-
tempts at defining petty and serious crimes for the
purpose of using the definition as a demarcation
line for the realization of constitutional rights.
In Duncan v. Louisiana," the Supreme Court held
that the sixth and fourteenth amendments guaran-
teed a right to a jury trial in all serious offenses.
Without defining the boundary between petty and
serious offenses, the Court held that a possible two
year sentence in the case at bar made the offense a
serious one.
In Baldwin v. New York 69 the Court made a
more specific delineation of the petty/serious
dichotomy by holding that with respect to the
right of trial by jury, serious offenses are those
which authorize more than six months imprison-
ment. While recognizing that imprisonment for
any length of time can result in serious repercus-
sions, the Court determined that the disadvantages
to the individual who is denied a jury trial in
non-serious cases were "outweighed by the benefits
that result from speedy and inexpensive non-jury
adjudications." 70 Although the Court specifically
refused to adopt the state's contention that the
petty/serious dichotomy should correspond to the
misdemeanor/felony dichotomy, the two concepts
are merely variations on the same theme--that
some constitutional rights do not attach to all
who are criminally accused.
After Baldwin, some courts adopted the serious/
petty distinction in cases concerning the right to
counsel. Of particular interest is judge Kerner's
opinion in United States ex rel. Singleton v. Woods
7'
in which he held that failure to advise a defendant
66 See e.g., United States ex rel. Singleton v. Woods,
440 F.2d 835 (7th Cii. 1971); Goslin v. Thomas, 400
F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1968).
6The petty/serious dichotomy varies little from the
misdemeanor/felony dichotomy. Both use possible
punishment as a criteria. Generally, the petty/serious
dichotomy has cut into the misdemeanor/felony
dichotomy by lowering the length of imprisonment
necessary for the attachment of constitutional rights
from one year to six months.-
68391 U.S. 145 (1968).
69 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
70 Id. at 73.
71440 F.2d 835 (7th Cir. 1971).
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of his right to appeal and right to court-appointed
counsel if indigent violated his right to equal
protection under the fourteenth amendment and
his right to counsel under the sixth amendment as
incorporated through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Judge Kerner recognized
that basic constitutional protections should not
"entirely depend on the distinction between mis-
demeanors and felonies," 12 and held that the right
to counsel applies to all serious offenses regardless
of whether they are felonies or misdemeanors.
Justices Black and Douglas, in their concurring
opinion in Baldwin," attacked the petty/serious
distinction. Their position was that the Constitu-
tion makes no such distinctions; the constitutional
guarantees are applicable to all criminal prosecu-
tions and for all crimes. The Supreme Court took
a long stride toward adopting the Black and
Douglas view in Argersinger v. Hamlin.74 Mr.
Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, held
that no person may be imprisoned for any offense
without representation by counsel at trial unless
he has knowingly and intelligently waived the
right to counsel regardless of whether the offense
is classified as petty, serious, misdemeanor or
felony. The Court specifically rejected the conten-
tion that since prosecutions for crimes punishable
by less than six months imprisonment were triable
without a jury they were also triable without
counsel."5
The decision in Argersinger, on its face, leaves
the misdemeanor/felony dichotomy intact with
respect to trial by jury, but the validity of the
dichotomy for defining when constitutional rights
attach is necessarily undermined by the rejection
of this position in Argersinger. Even with the
distinction still intact for determining the right
to a jury trial, Argersinger can be seen to have a
strong impact on the right to pre-trial discovery,
particularly if discovery is viewed as constitu-
tionally required. Argersinger suggests that an
individual is entitled to his constitutional rights
regardless of the classification of the crime, and as
so interpreted, would require the same treatment
for discovery if discovery is constitutionally re-
quired. It may be argued that Argersinger does
not eradicate the misdemeanor/felony dichotomy
for all constitutional rights, but is limited to the
facts present in the case. The Court is likely to
72 Id. at 837.
73 Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73 (1970).
- 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
71 Id. at 29.
adjudicate the validity of the misdemeanor/
felony distinction on a case by case basis with
respect to specific constitutional rights. Thus, the
Court might find the policies with respect to dis-
covery justify the application of the dichotomy as
is presently the situation with respect to the right
of trial by jury. However, if discovery is viewed as
essential to the full realization of the sixth amend-
ment right to counsel, the analogy to Argersinger
would be more compelling than the analogy to
the right to jury trial. And, if the Court were to
elevate discovery to a constitutional right on the
basis of the right to counsel, Argersinger would
presumably require pre-trial discovery in state
misdemeanor cases regardless of the existence or
absence of state laws on the subject.
Cases dealing with other constitutionally pro-
tected rights have also repudiated the misde-
meanor/felony dichotomy. In Camara v. Municipal
CourP and See v. City of Seattle," the defendants
were charged with misdemeanors for refusal to
allow a warrantless inspection of their premises in
violation of a municipal ordinance. Mr. justice
White, delivering the majority opinion in both
cases, held that the fourth amendment protections
against warrantless searches extends to adminis-
trative searches because such searches are "sig-
nificant intrusions upon the interests protected by
the Fourth Amendment." 78
Further erosion of the misdemeanor/felony
classification is seen in Groppi v. Wisconsin." In
Groppi, the Court struck down a Wisconsin state
law that denied a change of venue in a criminal
case, regardless of prejudice, solely on the ground
that the crime charged was a misdemeanor. The
Court held that the law violated the accused's
right to trial by an impartial jury under the sixth
amendment.
Very recently the California supreme court, in
Mills v. Municipal Court,8 announced what could
be the death knell for discrimination against mis-
demeanants by holding that misdemeanor guilty
pleas must conform to the standards previously set
for felony guilty pleas.8 The holding was predi-
cated on the observation that a misdemeanant, in
7" 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
387 U.S. 541 (1967).
78 387 U.S. 523, 534.
79 400 U.S. 505 (1971).
80 10 Cal. 3d 383, 515 P.2d 273, 110 Cal. Rptr. 329
(1973); contra, Johnson v. Texas, 503 S.W.2d 280
(Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
81 The standards for guilty pleas in felony cases was
set out in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
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pleading guilty, waives the same fundamental rights
as a felon--the privilege against self-incrimination,
the right to trial by jury, and the right to con-
frontation with the witnesses against him. Were
the Supreme Court to adopt such a position, it
would create serious doubts about the viability of
the Duncan and Baldwin position that the right
to trial by jury could be denied to misdemeanants.
To the extent that discovery is determined to be
constitutionally mandated, the clear import of the
preceding cases would compel the view that dis-
covery is required in misdemeanor cases. Such a
view would necessitate modification of the blanket
denial of misdemeanor discovery in People v.
Schmidt.P For example, the Illinois discovery
rules, held inapplicable to misdemeanants, encom-
passes Brady rights. If Brady requires pre-trial
discovery of the specified information on due
process grounds then Schmidt encompasses too
much. However, under the prevailing doctrine
that Brady applies only to disclosure of evidence
at trial, Schmidt could be reconciled by inter-
preting it as only denying pre-trial discovery.
At the present time, discovery, with the limited
exceptions previously discussed, is at best a state
created right. There has not been an explicit hold-
ing, apart from scholarly deductive reasoning, to
the effect that states must grant broad discovery
as exemplified by the Illinois discovery rules.
Nonetheless, many states have statutes regarding
criminal discovery, the vast majority of which do
not limit their applicability to feloniesP Where
discovery is denied to all criminal defendants alike,
it is difficult to see what strong constitutional
argument a misdemeanant could make for dis-
covery unless discovery itself was constitutionally
protected.
The situation where discovery is granted to
felons and denied to misdemeanants is a "horse of
a different color." In Griffin v. Illinois," a statute
that provided free transcripts only to indigent
defendants sentenced to death resulted in viola-
tions of the due process and equal protection
clauses of the fourteenth amendment. As Mr.
Justice Black said:
[O]ur own constitutional guarantees of due process
and equal protection both call for procedures in
12 See note 5 supra.
8 See notes 9 & 10 supra.
351 U.S. 12 (1956).
criminal trials which allow no invidious discrimina-
tions between persons and different groups of per-
sons. Both equal protection and due process empha-
size the central aim of our entire judicial system-
all people charged with crime must, so far as the
law is concerned, 'stand on an equality before the
bar of justice in every American Court.89
Griffin involved a state-granted, as opposed to a
constitutional, right-the right of appellate re-
view. The state is not required by the Federal
Constitution to provide avenues of appellate re-
view. But, the Court held that appellate review
was now an integral part of the Illinois-trial system
and that the due process and equal protection
clauses protect persons from invidious discrimina-
tion at all stages of the proceedings.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter noted that equal pro-
tection "does not deny a state the right to make
classifications in law when such classifications are
rooted in reason." " Griffin thus leaves open the
question of whether a misdemeanor/felony classifi-
cation is invidious or unreasonable. Several cases
indicate that such a classification is unreasonable.
In Williams v. Oklahoma Cityu the Court, again
dealing with the issue of free transcripts and
appellate review, held that once appellate review
is established it "must be kept free of unreasoned
distinctions that can only impede open and equal
access to the courts." 11 Although the issue of an
indigent's rights was again paramount, the state
sought to deny the right to a free transcript since
the defendant was charged with a misdemeanor.
Nonetheless, the Court held that such denial was
a violation of equal protection.
In the same vein, Judge Kerner, while sitting
on the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals,8 9 held
that the failure of the trial judge to advise an
indigent misdemeanant of his right to appeal and
his right to court-appointed counsel violates his
equal protection rights. Although this case deals
with the constitutional right to counsel, it is also
worthy of note for the point made by Judge
Mayor that once Illinois created the avenues to
appellate review they must be kept open to all
defendants whether they be felons or misdemean-
ants.
90
85Id. at 17.86 Id. at 21 [concurring opinion].
395 U.S. 458 (1969).
8s Id. at 459.
89 United States ex rd. Singleton v. Woods, 440 F.2d
835 (7th Cir. 1971).
10 Id. at 839 [concurring opinion].
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Mayer v. City of Chicago9 involved an indigent
defendant who was denied a free transcript solely
because his was a misdemeanor case. The-Court
held that the distinction drawn by the Illinois
Supreme Court Rulew which provided for free
trial transcripts only in felony cases 'was an un-
reasoned distinction proscribed by the fourteenth
amendment, noting that:
The distinction between felony and non felony
offenses drawn by Rule 607(b) can no more satisfy
the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment
than could the like distinction.., held invalid in
Groppi v. Wisconsin .... 93
Although Mayer involves indigency, there are
very compelling analogies to the situation in-
volving pre-trial discovery. Both the right to
appellate review and to pre-trial discovery were
state created and both were limited by statute to
felonies. The fact that Mayer deals with an indigent
defendant is of no consequence since it would be
inconsistent and illogical to hold that the state
has to treat indigent felons and misdemeanants
alike but can discriminate between felons and mis-
demeanants who are financially more fortunate.
The misdemeanor/felony dichotomy is largely
the result of balancing the state's and the in-
dividual's interests. The rationale used by the
state to justify the dichotomy is important in
determining whether it is sufficient to out-weigh
the need for discovery.
One possible rationale is that to grant sweeping
discovery rights in misdemeanor cases would clog
beyond imagination courts already -severely
burdened by over-crowded dockets. This rationale
necessarily rests on the premise that the grant of
discovery rights retards the operation of the
criminal justice system. However, the growth of
discovery, contrary to slowing up the judicial
process, has speeded it up. judge Earl Strayhorn,
of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, ob-
served significant practical benefits to the speedy
and efficient operation of the criminal justice sys-
tem after only one year of operating under Illinois'
liberalized discovery rules. 94 Judge Strayhorn
noted a very significant decrease in the amount of
time used in pre-trial preparation and a marked
shortening of the trial itself by the elimination of
91404 U.S. 189 (1971).
92 ILL. RFv. STAT. ch. 110A, § 607(b), (1971).
93 404 U.S. at 195-96.
4 Strayhorn, Full Criminal Discovery in Illinois: A
Judge's Experience, 56 JuDicATURE 279 (1973).
frequent recesses to chambers after the testimony
of each prosecution witness. Additionally, there
was an increase in the effectiveness of plea bargain-
ing, increases in the number of guilty pleas, and
more cases were dismissed and/or stricken from
the docket with leave to reinstate or nolle prose-
qui.99 The premise that pre-trial discovery will
slow the adjudicative process is thus not supported
in reality. Moreover, further improvement in the
speed and efficiency of criminal adjudication is
possible under automatic discovery rules which
eliminate the need for pre-trial motions and time
for compliance.
96
A second possible rationale for denying dis-
covery to misdemeanants is that the increased
cost that would result would be too great a financial
burden for a state's adjudicatory system to absorb.
Again, this rationale rests on a faulty premise. If
there is any increased cost to the state, it should
be more than outweighed by the increase in speed
and efficiency. Furthermore, there is some doubt
as to whether the-state's fiscal interest can justify
the deprivation of certain rights. The state's fiscal
interest was raised in Mayer as a justification for
denying free transcripts to indigent misdemean-
ants. The Court, however, held the state's fiscal
interest to be irrelevant.97 In a different context
the Supreme Court recognized that the state has a
legitimate interest in preserving its fiscal integrity
and the fiscal integrity of its programs, but it may
not protect that interest by invidious distinctions
between classes of its citizens.9" If the misde-
meanor/felony dichotomy is unreasonable or
invidious then the state's rationale falls.
CONCLUSION
Since Justice Cardozo first saw the glimmerings
of discovery in People ex rel. Lemon v. Superior
Court,99 the judicial, legislative and scholarly trend
has been toward greater recognition of the im-
portance of discovery. The most far reaching
views concerning discovery treat it as a constitu-
95 Id. at 280.
96 ARxz. R. Cxii. P. 15.1 (1973).
97 Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 197 (1971):
The indiviousness of the discrimination that exists
when criminal procedures are made available only
to those who can pay is not eased by any differences
in the sentences that may be imposed.
N The Supreme Court has recognized that the state
has a legitimate interest in its fiscal integrity but it
can not satisfy that interest by creating invidious dis-
criminations. Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
99 245 N.Y. 24, 156 N.E. 84 (1927).
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tional right. Although this doctrine is still in the
budding stage, it is an excellent illustration of the
progress that has been achieved with respect to
the liberalization of pre-trial discovery in crminial
cases.
With respect to Illinois discovery rules and
Peopl v. Sckmidt, 00 the following observations
can be made. First, the Illinois discovery rules, as
far as they have been interpreted to deny rights
set down in Brady v. Maryland, are unconstitu-
tional under the due process and equal protection
clauses of the fourteenth amendment. This posi-
tion, of course, is disputable, but the recent trend
in criminal cases in affording constitutional rights
to all criminally accused alike argues strongly in
favor of it. Secondly, the position taken in recent
cases concerning the denial of a state created right
to misdemeanants would compel a similar con-
clusion with respect to pre-trial discovery. Since
discovery is becoming an integral part of Illinois'
criminal justice system, the Mayer decision should
be controlling.
In jurisdictions with statutes that imply a mis-
100 8 I3L App. 3d 1024, 291 N.E.2d 225 (1972).
demeanor/felony dichotomy the problem has not
yet been litigated. The statutes in those jurisdic-
tions are not as explicit as that in Illinois and are
susceptible to an interpretation that would permit
discovery in misdemeanor cases.
As yet, the Supreme Court has not held that
discovery is a constitutionally protected right.
Nevertheless, a great many states, both judicially
and legislatively, have adopted sweeping discovery
procedures. Where these rights have been granted
to felons but denied to misdemeanants the evi-
dence points to the conclusion that such statutes
or rules would be unconstitutional if applied to
deny a misdemeanant the right to discovery since
they would then violate the proscriptions of the
fourteenth amendment. The need for discovery,
the effect of discovery on certain constitutional
rights regardless of whether discovery itself is
constitutionally required, the general repudiation
of the misdemeanor/felony dichotomy and the
lack of valid reasons for denying misdemeanor
discovery lead to the conclusion that discovery, if
permitted at all by the state, must be granted to
all persons accused of crime regardless of the
classification of the charge.
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THE FIRST AMENDMENT OVERBREADTH DOCTRINE: A COMPARISON
OF DELLINGER AND BARANSKI
In United States v. Dellingeri and United States v.
Baranski' the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
considered defendants' first amendment rights in
the context of the first amendment overbreadth
doctrine. Within a period of a year, the court, in
applying the same concepts to factually similar
situations, arrived at differing constructions of this
doctrine. Judge Pell, who had written the dissent-
ing opinion in Dellinger,' wrote the opinion of the
court in Baranski. In Baranski he presented a set
of threshold standards which differed from those
presented in Dellinger although both controlled
the application of the overbreadth doctrine. While
in both cases the court premised its decision on the
same legal rules, the Baranski decision differed in
its more rigid adherence to the primacy of the first
amendment rights which form the basis of the first
amendment overbreadth doctrine.
In Baranski the defendants were arrested and
tried for acts committed in protest of the Viet Nam
war. On the afternoon of April 29, 1971, John
Baranski, Thomas Clark, Eileen Marie Kruetz
and Mary Elizabeth Lubbers went to the offices
of three draft boards housed in the same building
in Evanston, Illinois. Once in the offices, they
opened drawers and filing cabinets, removed some
records, and poured animal blood over them. They
waited quietly for the police whom the board secre-
tary had telephoned. When the police arrived, the
defendants said that they would non-violently sub-
mit to arrest. Upon receiving permission, they
prayed and read aloud from the New Testament.
They also distributed a signed letter in explanation
and justification of their acts. The defendants were
arrested and charged in a four count indictment
with 1) wilful damage to mlitary property,4 2) re-
moval, mutilation and destruction of records;' 3)
interference with the administration of the Mili-
tary Selective Service Act;6 and 4) conspiracy to
commit the above offenses.7 The jury acquitted
1472 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
970 (1973).
' 484 F.2d 556 (7th Cir. 1973).
3 472 F.2d at 409.
4 18 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970).
518 U.S.C. § 2071 (1970).
6 Military Selective Service Act of 1967 § 1(11), 50
U.S.C. § 462(a) (1970).
718 U.S.C. § 371 (1970).
the defendants of the three substantive counts, but
convicted them on the conspiracy count. On ap-
peal, the defendants contended that the statute
prohibiting interference with the Military Selec-
tive Service Act unconstitutionally abridged the
freedom of speech guaranteed by the first amend-
ment. The court of appeals found the language of
the statute overbroad and held the provision void
on its face.8
United States v. Dellinger also involved acts of
political protest. During the last week of August,
1968, the Democratic party held its national con-
vention in Chicago. During this time several vio-
lent encounters occurred between city police and
individuals in the streets and parks of Chicago.
As leaders of the National Mobilization Commit-
tee to End the War in Viet Nam, David Dellinger,
Rennie Davis and Tom Hayden were arrested and
charged with conspiracy to travel in and use the
facilities of interstate commerce with intent to in-
cite, organize, promote and encourage a riot.9 They
were also charged with conspiracy to participate
in and carry on a riot, to commit acts of violence
in furtherance of a riot, and to aid and abet persons
in inciting and carrying on a riot." The indictment
also included charges of conspiracy to teach or
demonstrate the use of incendiary devices with
knowledge that they would be used in a civil dis-
order which might obstruct commerce, or to in-
terfere with a fireman or law enforcement officer
engaged in his duties during such a civil disorder."
The specific language which the court found objection-
able read as follows:
... any person or persons who shall knowingly
hinder or interfere or attempt to do so in any way,
by force or violence or otherwise, with the adminis-
tration of this title or the rules or regulations made
pursuant thereto, or who conspires to commit any
one or more of such offenses, shall, upon convic-
tion in any district court of the United States of
competent jurisdiction, be punished by imprison-
ment for not more than five years....8 Military Selective Service Act of 1967 § 1(11), 50
U.S.C. App. § 462(a) (1970).
9 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1970) (the conspiracy charge);
Anti-Riot Act § 1(a), (b), 18 U.S.C. § 2101(a), (b)
(1970) (the substantive provision).
10 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1970) (the conspiracy charge);
Anti-Riot Act § 1(b)-(d), 18 U.S.C. § 2101(b)-(d)
(1970) (the substantive provision).
' 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1970) (the conspiracy charge);
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As leaders of Youth International Party, Y.I.P.,
Abbie Hoffman and Jerry Rubin were also charged
in the conspiracy count. In addition each of these
defendants was charged in a separate count with
travelling in interstate commerce to Chicago with
the intent to incite, organize, promote and en-
courage a riot" and, thereafter, on specified dates
and at specified locations, speaking to an assem-
blage of persons for the purpose of inciting, organiz-
ing and encouraging a riot."
A jury acquitted the defendants on the conspir-
acy count, but convicted each of them on the in-
dividual counts. On appeal, the defendants argued
that the Anti-Riot Act 4  unconstitutionally
abridged their first amendment right to freedom
of speech. The court of appeals, however, held that
the statute, when properly interpreted, prohibited
only conduct which was not constitutionally pro-
tected.15
The first amendment introduces the concept of
freedom of expression into the American legal sys-
tem 6 In resolving a conflict, however, courts do
not simply refer to the concept of freedom of ex-
pression as a basis for decision. The legal system
imposes an intermediary system of rules ordering
the determination of conflicts. Through these rules,
abstract concepts such as freedom of expression
influence conduct in a society. At the same time,
the factual situations to which a court applies these
rules shape the content of the rules, thereby shap-
ing the content of the abstract concept.
17
As part of its decision in Dellinger, the court
formulated general rules concerning the first
amendment overbreadth doctrine. Applying these
18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1), (3) (1970) (the substantive
provision).12Anti-Riot Act § 1, 18 U.S.C. § 2101 (1970).
13 472 F.2d at 349. "
' Anti-Riot Act § 1, 18 U.S.C. § 2101 (1970).
15 472 F.2d at 355.
16 U.S. CoNsT. amend. I. As Judge Pell noted in his
dissent in United States v. Dellinger:
Sometimes people are prone to speak offhandedly
and perhaps slightly inaccurately of well-established
or cherished concepts without resort to the exact
text of the source. The plain language of the First
Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States of America is 'Congress shall make no
law... abridging the freedom of speech.' United
States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 414 (7th Cir.
1972) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
970 (1973).
Cf. McKay, The Preference for Freedom, 34 N.Y.U.L.
Rzv. 1182, 1188 (1959). For a brief discussion of the
historical background of the first amendment, see Calm,
The Firstness of the First Amendment, 65 YALE L.J. 464
(1956).
" See E. Iv, AN INTRODUCTION To LEGAL REASON-
ING 3 (1949).
rules, the court in Dellinger found the questioned
statute to be constitutionally valid. In Baranski
the court accepted the general rules as stated in
Dellinger. Yet in applying these rules to a similar
factual situation, the court in Baranski reached an
opposite conclusion which invalidated the ques-
tioned clause. Because of this difference in applica-
tion, the decision of the Seventh Circuit in Baran-
ski presents an alternative statement of the first
amendment overbreadth doctrine. The general
concept of freedom of expression forms the basis
of this doctrine; thus, in differing in their inter-
pretation of the overbreadth doctrine, the deci-
sions of Dellinger and Baranski also differed in their
definition of the concept of freedom of expression18
The court in Dellinger formulated the following
statement of the first amendment overbreadth
doctrine: 9
The doctrine of overbreadth applies when a statute
lends itself to a substantial number of im-
permissible applications, such that it is capable of
deterring protected conduct, when the area af-
fected by the challenged law involves first amend-
ment interests, and when there is not a valid con-
struction which avoids abridgment of first amend-
ment interests' 0
This statement of the overbreadth doctrine
presents three criteria which the court must con-
sider in determining whether the doctrine applies.
First, the court must determine if the challenged
law affects first amendment interests. If the area
affected by the law does not involve such interests,
then the court need not deal with the remaining
criteria since they relate only to first amendment
considerations. The second criterion requires that
the court determine whether the challenged statute
lends itself to a substantial number of impermissi-
ble applications and, therefore, is capable of de-
SE. L.vi, supra note 17, at 4. Concepts such as
freedom of expression do not represent fixed absolutes.
The ambiguity inherent in legal rules permits the shap-
ing of these rules to reflect the values of the society in
which they function. As Levi points out:
Legal reasoning has a logic of its own. Its struc-
ture fits it to give meaning to ambiguity and to test
constantly whether the society has come to see new
differences or similarities. Social theories and other
changes in society will be relevant when the ambig-
uity has to be resolved for a particular case.
Thus a difference in interpretation of the first amend-
ment overbreadth doctrine reflects a more basic dif-
ference within society.
19 For an extensive analysis of the first amendment
overbreadth doctrine see, Note, The First Amend-
ment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. REV. 844
(1970).
20472 F.2d at 357.
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terring protected conduct. A statute may regulate
or even prohibit expression, and yet be so narrowly
drawn that it abridges only expression which falls
outside the protection of the first amendment. A
statute meets this second criterion only if it is so
broadly worded that by its terms it applies to ex-
pression which is constitutionally protected as well
as expression outside the protection of the first
amendment. If the statute meets the first and
second criteria, the court reaches the third crite-
rion. This criterion requires that the court seek a
construction of the statute which does not abridge
first amendment rights. If the court cannot achieve
a valid construction, the overbreadth doctrine re-
quires that the court hold the challenged provision
void on its face. Only if the challenged statute
meets all three of these requirements, will the over-
breadth doctrine apply.
In evaluating the three criteria of the doctrine
the court in Dellinger formulated two specific ques-
tions to be answered.n The first question was the
"threshold question," that is,
whether the statute relates to expression and is
therefore governed by first amendment considera-
tions.4
The answer to this question determines whether
the statute meets the first criteria for the applica-
tion of the overbreadth doctrine, the question of
whether the area affected by the challenged statute
involves first amendment interests.
If, under the threshold question, the court con-
cludes that the statute relates to expression, it
reaches the "removal question," that is,
whether the expressive conduct is so related to
action that the expression is therefore carved away
from the protection of the first amendment.n
In evaluating the removal question, the court also
evaluates the remaining two criteria of the over-
breadth doctrine: 1) whether the statute lends itself
to a substantial number of impermissible applica-
tions and 2) whether a valid construction is possi-
ble. Thus, there are two possible ways in which the
court may determine that the expressive conduct
is removed from the protection of the first amend-
ment. First, although the challenged statute may
deter expression, it may still be so narrowly drawn
that it affects only expression which the first
21 Id. at 358. The court also applied these two spe-
cific questions in considering the challenged provision
in Baranski.
22 472 F.2d at 358.
23 Id.
amendment does not protect. If the legislature in
effecting its goal limited the application of the
statute to conduct which it had authority to pro-
hibit, expression inextricably related to such con-
duct is removed from the protection of the first
amendment. Such a statute would not meet the
second requirement of the overbreadth doctrine,
that is, it would not lend itself to a substantial
number of impermissible applications.
Second, if the court construes the statute in
language which avoids abridgment of first amend-
ment interests, it has accomplished what the legis-
lature failed to do; it has narrowed the application
of the statute to expression outside the protection
of the first amendment. If such a valid construc-
tion is possible, the statute does not meet the third
requirement for the application of the overbreadth
doctrine since the court has found a construction
of the statute which does not abridge first amend-
ment rights. Thus, the court may find, either
through a reading of the statute or through its own
construction, that the expressive conduct in ques-
tion is so related to action that the first amendment
does not protect the conduct.
Having acknowledged the general principles of
the overbreadth doctrine and having accepted the
specific questions embodying these principles, it
remains for the court to evaluate the facts before
it. Turning to an evaluation, the court first con-
siders whether the challenged statute relates to
first amendment interests. In considering this
threshold question, the court has two alternative
bases for evaluation, the defendant's particular
conduct or the general impact of the statute.
Traditionally, a court exercises limited review
confined to the evaluation of facts arising from a
particular application of the statute.2 4 In the ad-
judication of a case involving first amendment
rights, the court's concern extends beyond the
vindication of the defendant's own rights. In first
amendment cases, the courts recognize the inhibi-
tory effect which an overbroad statute may have
on constitutionally protected conduct.25 This con-
2 See United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 20
(1960); Yazzo & M.V.R.R. v. Jackson Vinegar Co.,
226 U.S. 217, 219 (1912).2
6See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965)
(an overbroad or vague statute may lead to a "chilling
effect" on first amendment rights); Baggett v. Bullit,
377 U.S. 360 (1964) (the vagueness of a statute may
inhibit the exercise of first amendment freedoms and
cause an individual to steer far wider of the unlawful
zone than if the boundaries of the forbidden area were
dear). See also, Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S.
109, 137 (1959) (Black, 3., dissenting):
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sideration has led the courts to reject a method of
adjudication which requires the appearance of a
privileged complainant before eliminating statu-
tory overbreadth.26 The importance of first amend-
ment considerations requires that any question of
their infringement be resolved with alacrity."7 A
possibility that a statute may inhibit the exercise
of first amendment rights requires prompt judicial
review of the challenged provision. The court,
therefore, considers the general impact of the stat-
ute, making any evaluation of defendant's own
conduct irrelevant.
In considering the threshold question the court
in both Dellinger and Bafanski concluded that the
statute in question related to expression. In each
case, the court based its conclusion on a considera-
tioni of the general impact of the statute. The fed-
eral Anti-Riot Act which the court considered in
Dellinger did not specifically refer to expression,
but' prohibited travelling in interstate commerce
with intent to incite a riot." It is not, however,
the specific terms of a statute but its impact which
is crucial in determining whether the statute re-
lates to expression." As the court observed in
A statute broad enough to support infringement
of speech, writings, thoughts, and public assemblies
... necessarily leaves all persons to guess just what
the law really means to cover, and fear of a wrong
guess inevitably leads people to forego the very
rights the Constitution sought to protect above all
others.
26See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963);
NAACP v. Alabama ex rd. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449
(1958).
27 To some extent, the costs of delay are inherent in a
system of constitutional adjudication including the re-
quirements of article Mr. The need to dispose of over-
breadth problems with dispatch, however, does not
offend article HI if the complainant is viewed as as-
serting his own right not to be burdened by an uncon-
stitutional statute. See text accompanying note 36
infra.
28 Anti-Riot Act § 1, 18 U.S.C. § 2101 (1970) provides:
Whoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce
or uses any facility of interstate or foreign com-
merce, including, but not limited to, the mail, tele-
graph, telephone, radio, or television, with intent-
(A) to incite a riot; or
(B) to organize, promote, encourage, participate in,
or carry on a riot; or
(C) to commit any act of violence in furtherance
of a riot; or
(D) to aid or abet any person in inciting or partici-
pating in or carrying on a riot or committing
any act of violence in furtherance of a riot;
and who either during the course of any such travel
or use or thereafter performs or attempts to per-
form any other overt act for any purpose specified
in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (D) of this
paragraph-
Shall be fined not more than $10,000, or impris-
oned not more than five years, or both.
29 472 F.2d at 458.
Dellinger, rioting has historically occurred as an
expression of political, economic and social reac-
tion.30 The Anti-Riot Act made the individual
liable for causing a riot. Congress may validly seek
to prevent riots; it may not, however, abridge
freedom of speech. Because of the possibility that
some form of expression may cause a riot, first
amendment considerations require that the statute
draw a careful distinction between expression
which the constitution protects and expression
which the legislature may validly prohibit.
In concluding that the statute in question re-
lated to expression, the court in Baranski relied
on the words of the statute itself which prohibited
interference with the Military Selective Service
Act "by force or violence or otherwise." 1' This
statute literally, prohibited interference by any
means including expression. In support of its con-
clusion the court in Baranski cited United States v.
Eberhardt"2 in which the court held that this phrase
relieved the prosecution of any obligation to show
force or violence.
Because the court considered the general impact
of the statutes rather than defendants' particular
conduct, it did need to consider whether defend-
ants' conduct was "speech" in the context of the
first amendment." In Dellinger the court offered
the generalized definition of speech as "conduct
which makes an offer in the market place of
ideas." 14 Although the charge of incitement to riot
rested wholly on the defendants' speeches, the
court in Dellinger did not consider whether the
speeches themselves represented expression pro-
tected by the first amendment. The court referred
to the defendants' particular conduct only as a
relevant example supporting its conclusion that the
statute related to expression.35 In Baranski, the
court condemned the defendants' conduct as- in-
tolerable and inexcusable, noting specifically, hat
it was not per se privileged under the first amend-
ment. 6 Again, however, the court did not go
farther and consider whether the defendants' con-
duct qualified as "speech" protected by the first
amendment.
30 Id. at 359.
31 Military Selective Service Act of 1967 § 1(11), 50
U.S.C. App. § 462(a) (1970).
12417 F.2d 1009 1013 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 909 (1970).
"Cf. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
But see Bradenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)
(Douglas, J., concurring).
4472 F.2d at 358.
35 Id. at 359.
36 484 F.2d at 565.
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Since the court considers the general impact of
the statute, consideration of whether defendant's
speech is privileged conduct is irrelevant in deter-
mining whether the statute infringes protected
conduct. Determination of whether the defendant's
conduct is "speech" within the meaning of the first
amendment is similarly irrelevant in considering
the first amendment overbreadth doctrine. The
analysis of the threshold question involves con-
sideration of the general impact of the statute
which the court evaluates in terms of hypotheticals
and general conclusions. The requirements of
"justiciability" and "case or controversy" give
rise to the concept of standing in constitutional
law, and it is the concept of standing which pro-
hibits the court from considering the rights of
third parties not before the courtY In using hypo-
theticals and general conclusions to evaluate the
general impact of the statute, however, the court
does not violate the requirement of standing by
considering the rights of parties not before the
court. As a theoretical matter, the court considers
only the defendant's assertion of his own right not
to be burdened by an unconstitutional rule of law.s
37As examples showing that the canon against us
tertii claims is relaxed when fundamental rights are at
stake and third parties are unable to effectively pro-
tect themselves, see NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415
(1963); NAACP v. Alabama ex red. Patterson, 357 U.S.
449 (1958). See also Note, The First Amendment Over-
breadth Doctrine, supra note 19, at 848.
3 The test defining a sufficient relationship of ex-
pression to action has posed a continuing problem in
the adjudication of first amendment rights. Mr. Justice
Holmes first formulated the "clear and present danger"
test in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47,52 (1919).
Theprecise meaning of the phrase has been a source of
contning debate. Professor Freund points out that:
The test is pretty clearly drawn from the criminal
law, and in particular from Holmes' analysis of the
criminal law as a scholar and state judge; for the
criminal law is necessarily concerned with the line
at which innocent preparation ends and a guilty
conspiracy attempt begins.
P. FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPRExE COURT
25 (1949).
In Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919),
Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919), and
Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919) the Court
applied the Schenk doctrine to affirm the convictions of
dissidents during World War I. These World War I
cases introduced the concept of "clear and present
danger" into first amendment considerations.
In Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941), the
Court approved the "clear and present danger" test,
confining it, however, to a narrow category. In Dennis
v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), the Court in-
troduced the "not improbable test" of judge Learned
Hand. This test required a determination of "whether
the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability,
justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to
avoid the danger." United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d
201, 212 (1950), a~f'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
An evaluation of the threshold question in terms
of the general impact of the statute enables the
court promptly to consider the validity of any
statute which possibly infringes first amendment
rights.
As the next step in evaluating the facts, the
court determines whether the expression is so re-
lated to action that the expression is removed from
the protection of the first amendment. The re-
moval question raises the problem of the test to be
used to determine if the expression is so closely
related to conduct that the legislature may pro-
hibit the expression."9 In promulgating the test to
determine when expression is removed from the
protection of the first amendment, the court in
Dellinger observed that constitutional protection
is not limited to mild or innocuous presentation.
The value of unfettered speech implicit in the first
amendment precludes any formula punishing ad-
vocacy of violence in terms of fervor or vigor." The
court then concluded that "the real question is
whether particular speech is intended to and has
such capacity to propel action that it is reasonable
to treat such speech as action." 41
Accepting this statement of the test, the legisla-
ture may prohibit only those forms of expression
which have a substantial relation to action. Be-
cause of the peculiar vulnerability of first amend-
ment rights, the Supreme Court has required that
legislation in this area be narrowly specific in its
In Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957), the
Court drew a distinction between advocacy to do
something and advocacy to believe in something. The
Court in Bradenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969),
refined this distinction. Before advocacy of the use of
force may be prohibited, it must be shown 1) that "such
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action" and 2) that such advocacy "is likely to
produce such action." 395 U.S. at 447.
The test has thus evolved towards a separation of
"conduct" into "expression" which is always protected
and "action" which is not. Even under this test, the
dichotomy between action and expression is not al-
ways clear. Expression may be so closely linked to ac-
tion that they have equivalent impact. In such mixed
cases, a test separating conduct into "action" and "ex-
pression" would require that the court then determine
whether the harm is immediate and instantaneous, and
whether it is remediable only by punishing and thereby
preventing the conduct. T. EuERsoN, TOWARD A
GENERr. TEORY oP T=E FIRST AmENDNTx 59 (1966).
Cf. Bradenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (Douglas,
J., concurring); Speiser v. Randal, 357 U.S. 513, 536
(1958) (Douglas, J., concurring:" [A]dvocacy whichisin
no way brigaded to action should always be protected
by the First Amendment."); A. MxrcaxjomH, FRE
SPEECH AND IS RELATION TO SEry-GOVEUA NT
(1948).
39 472 F.2d at 360.




terms and-effect.4 2 A determination that the statute
relates to expression imposes the further requi.re-
ment that the statute be sufficiently specific to
prohibit only constitutionally unprotected con-
duct. •
While advocacy of violence may have the capac-
ity to propel action in certain circumstances, the
Supreme Court has held a statutory prohibition
of advocacy of violence overbroad." Although
recognizing that the legislature may validly seek
to prevent acts of violence, the Court found that
mere advocacy of violence did not have a sufficient
probability of provoking violence to allow the
legislature to prohibit the expression in order to
prevent the action."
In applying the removal test to the language of
the federal Anti-Riot Act, the court in Dellinger
distinguished incitement to riot from advocacy of
violence. 5 The court first considered the statute
as a whole in order to determine the meaning of
incitement. Analyzing the provisions of the statute,
the court concluded that Congress had described
a "disorder of a type which is enough of an assault
on the property and personal safety interests of
the community so that participation in a riot or
intentionally and successfully causing a riot can be
made a criminal offense." 46 The court in Dellinger
found that the terms of the statute embodied a
relation to action by construing them to require
that a riot occur.47 The court held that the term
incitement was so closely related to propulsion to
action that it was removed from the protection of
the first amendment.43 The court thus distinguished
"incitement" from the broader term "advocacy of
violence."
As part of the statutory review, the court in
Dellinger also construed the definition of incitement
included in the Act. The Act specifically provided
that the term "to incite a riot ... shall not be
deemed to mean themere oral or written... expres-
sion of belief, not involving advocacy of any act
or acts of violence or assertion of the rightness of,
42See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)
("Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing
space to survive, government may regulate in the area
of first amendment rights only with narrow specific-
ity."); Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
43 See Bradenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (over-
ruling Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927));
Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
4 See Bradenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
45 472 F.2d at 360.
4 Id. at 361.
47 Id.
41 Id. at 362.
or the right to commit any such act or-acts?" 4
The court itself 'characterized the- language of this
provision as. "obtuse .and obscure." 50 The court
nevertheless concluded that the provision excluded
advocacy of violence from the definition of incite-
ment.3 ' - I
In considering the statute, the court in Dellinger
relied on .the principle -of statutory construction
which requires a court to construe statutes so as
to avoid-constitutional questions.12 This principle
of saving construction, however is not an absolute
rule. In considering first amendment rights, the
Supreme Court has rejected statutory construc-
tions which would have resulted in judicial rewrit-
ing of the statute." The legislature may have a
legitimate interest in regulating the conduct; the
validity of the legislative judgment is not the issue.
If a statute inhibits first amendment activities, the
49Anti-Riot Act §,I(a)(1)(A),(B), 18 U.S.C. §
2101(a) (1)(A),(B) (1970).
10 472 F.2d at 364.511d. at 363. By construing the language of the
statute on its face, the court in Ddlnger avoided con-
sideration of any limiting rule:
In those instances of overbreadth where no readily
apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle
for rehabilitating the statute in a single prosecution
... the whole statute must be declared a violation
of the first amendment, and void for all applica-
tions.
472 U.S. at 356.
The court in Baranski considered the ejusdem generis
rule as a means of attaining a sufficiently limited con-
struction. Rejecting this rule, the court found it un-
likely that any single opinion resolving a case or con-
troversy could clearly delineate the line between con-
stitutional and unconstitutional conduct. Cf. Dom-
browski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 491 (1965) in which
the court stated:
As we observed this [authoritative construction)
cannot be satisfactorily done through a series of
criminal prosecutions.... We believe that those
affected by a statute are entitled to be free of the
burdens of defending prosecutions however expe-
ditiously aimed at hammering out the structure
of the statute piecemeal, with no likelihood of ob-
viating similar uncertainty for others.
See also Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
1 See Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716,
727 (1951) (dissenting opinion); cf. Gregory v. City of
Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 118 (1969) (Black, J., con-
curring); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1874)
(interpreting a federal statute).
53See United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 267
(1967):
The task of writing legislation which will stay
within these bounds has been committed to Con-
gress. Our decision today simply recognizes that,
when legitimate legislative concerns are ex-
pressed in a statute which imposes a substantial
burden on protected First Amendment activities,
Congress must achieve its goals by means which
have a 'less drastic' impact on the continued
vitality of First Amendment activities.




legislature must achieve its goals through means
which have a less drastic effect.M The importance
of first amendment rights limits judicial revision
in the form of extensive construction and interpre-
tation of the statutory language.
The traditional distinction between the func-
tions of the legislature and the judiciary is particu-
larly relevant in first amendment questions. Free-
dom of expression may be vital to minority inter-
ests. 55 A decision to limit freedom of expression
therefore should be the function of the legislature
as, the body more capable of representing diverse
elements in a society. Any ambiguity in the extent
of such a limitation should similarly be reserved
for legislative, rather than judicial, resolution.
The principle of saving construction presumes a
legislative intent to act only within constitutional
bounds.16 As the court itself observed in Dellinger,
first amendment considerations greatly weaken
this presumption.i A court will not presume that
the statute curtails constitutionally protected con-
duct as little as possible.m Nor will a court accept
a showing of a mere rational basis for the legisla-
tion where it impinges on first amendment rights.59
4See United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 267
(1967).
11 See Emerson, The Right to Protest, in THE RiGHTs
oF AmEcANs WHAT THEY Ay-WAT THEY SiaouLp
BE 209 (N. Dorsen ed. 1970).
11 See United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 120 (1948);
Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 70 (1948) (Jack-
son, J., dissenting). Cf. Note, Supreme Court Interpreta-
lion of Statutes to Avoid Constitutional Decisions, 53
CoLum. L. RZv. 633 (1953).
7 472 F.2d at 356:
Within this range in non-first amendment cases
there might additionally be said to be a presump-
tion that the statute was meant to operate only
within the limits of legislative power, .... In first
amendment cases that presumption is either greatly
weakened or dropped. (citation omitted)
cf. McKay, supra note 16, at 1213:
In such instances [where legislation impinges on the
freedom of expression] to say that there is no pre-
sumption of constitutionality is simply to recog-
nize in one way the preferred position of these
freedoms.
58See McKay, supra note 16, at 1213:
In such instances [where legislation impinges on
freedom of thought] to say that there is no pre-
sumption of constitutionality is simply to recognize
in one way the preferred position of these freedoms.
This is not to say... that there is a presumption
that such legislation is unconstitutional. It is
rather no more than a way of signaling the special
importance to society of these rights and noting
that they may not be regulated by showing a mere
'rational basis' for legislation.
11 See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,432 (1963):
If the line drawn by the decree between the per-
mitted and prohibited activities ... is an ambigu-
ous one, we will not presume that the statute cur-
tails constitutionally protected conduct as little as
possible.
An examination of the statute must show that it
applies only to forms of expression which the legis-
lature may validly prohibit in society's interest.
In contrast to the extensive judicial construction
in Dellinger, the court in Baranski refused to excise
the doubtful statutory language in order to achieve
a constitutional construction. Because of the first
amendment interests involved, the court in Baran-
ski left the statutory ambiguity to legislative rather
than judicial resolution. The court in Dellinger
avoided consideration of any constitutional ques-
tion through extensive construction and inter-
pretation of the challenged provisions. In refusing
similarly to rewrite the statute, the court in Baran-
ski adhered to the particular requirements imposed
by the special nature of first amendment rights.
These same considerations apply to judicial use
of legislative history as evidence of legislative in-
tent. The court in Dellinger obliquely employed
legislative history to support its construction of
the statute. 0 During consideration of the Anti-
Riot Act,61 Congress was warned that the inclu-
sion of advocacy of violence in the definition of riot
would invalidate the statute." The court in Del-
linger assumed that Congress heeded these warn-
ings. Judge Pell in his dissent, also discussed the
legislative history,"3 but found an equally clear
intent to include advocacy of violence in the defini-
tion.
Read together, the majority and dissenting
opinions show that the legislative intent was at
best ambiguous. Since legislation represents the
product of group action where much of the group
may be ignorant or misinformed, such ambiguity
is understandable. Passage of a bill does not re-
quire that each legislator agree on its effect; each
may well have a different interpretation of a law's
application. Thus, legislative intent, as inferred
from legislative history, inevitably remains am-
biguous.6
60 The context of language and the legislative history
may be the best guides to congressional purpose and
the extent to which Congress enacted a policy. Welsh
v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 347 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring). The ambiguity of legislative intent, as
implied from legislation, limits its use as support for a
determination of the constitutional validity of a statute.
See note 65 infra.
1 H.R. 2516, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
6See, e.g., letter from Attorney General, accompany-
ing proposed bill, 114 CONG. Rrc. 5213 (March 5, 1968).
"472 F.2d at 410.
"See E. LEvI, supra note 17, at 30:
In a significant sense there is only a general intent
which preserves as much ambiguity in the con-
cept used as though it had been created by case
law.... [F]or a legislature perhaps the pressures
are such that a bill has to be passed dealing with a
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In Baranski the court also referred to legislative
history to* support its position that Congress in-
tended to give the term otherwise in the phrase
"by force or violence or otherwise," a meaning
beyond "force or violence." 11 In Baranki the
legislative history seemed to imply support for the
court's position. Yet, if the importance of the first
amendment prohibits judicial rewriting of am-
biguous statutory language, it would also seem to
limit reliance upon ambiguous legislative history
to support a finding of constitutional validity.
Overbroad statutory language presents other
problems beyond those concerning interpretation
and construction of ambiguous provisions. An over-
broad statute affecting first amendment rights re-
sults in both an absence of fair notice and an un-
channelled delegation of legislative authority. A
statute capable of sweeping and improper applica-
tion may also result in the prosecution of protected
conduct. 61 Although it has been argued that the
court will point out any errors in application of the
statute, the Supreme Court has refused to assume
that even subsequent litigation will resolve any
ambiguities in favor of first amendment rights.6
Furthermore, even if litigation resulted in the ulti-
mate vindication of constitutional rights, the chill-
ing effect of prosecutions for protected conduct
would still remain.6 As the Supreme Court has
pointed out, well-intentioned prosecutors cannot
obviate the vices of an overbroad statute. 69
While improper prosecutions may result from a
well-intentioned excess of zeal, zeal is not the only
source of danger to first amendment rights. Im-
proper prosecutions also present a means of sup-
certain subject. But the precise effect of the bill is
not something upon which the members have to
reach agreement.... The members of the legisla-
tive body will be talking about different things;
.... It cannot be forgotten that to speak of legis-
lative intent is to talk of group action, where much
of the group may be ignorant or misinformed.
65484 F.2d at 568.
6See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432 (1963);
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940):
The existence of such a statute, which readily lends
itself to harsh and discriminatory enforcement by
local prosecuting officials against particular groups
deemed to merit their displeasure, results in a con-
tinuous and pervasive restraint on all freedom of
discussion that might reasonably be regarded as
within its purview.
6 See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,438 (1963):
If there is an internal tension between proscription
and protection in the statute, we cannot assume
that in its subsequent enforcement, ambiguities
will be resolved in favor of First Amendment rights.
68 See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 494
(1965).
11 See Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 373 (1964).
pression of minority views.70 The Supreme Court
has refused to rely on either the ability or the de,-
sire of prosecutors and law enforcement officials
to distinguish constitutionally protected conduct.
In Baranski the court rejected the government's
argument that the questioned clause posed no
threat to first amendment rights since no prosecu-
tor had yet misused it. The government argued
that the absence of misuse showed that the statute
was sufficiently specific to insure its application
only to conduct falling outside the protection of
the first amendment. The government contended
that even if such misuse were to occur, the courts
would point out the error.7 In rejecting these argu-
ments, the court in Baranski found the statutory
language objectionable not only because it failed
to give adequate guidance to potential actors by
permitting them clearly to distinguish between
prohibited and permissible conduct, but also be-
cause it failed to guide law enforcement officials
in making this distinction12'
In Dellinger, the court admitted that the consti-
tutionality of the statute was a close question.7 In
resolving this question in favor of the statute's
validity, the court acknowledged that parts of the
statutory language were obtuse and obscureY
Nevertheless, the court found the statutory lan-
guage sufficiently specific to preclude the possibility
of prosecution for protected conduct. Employing
the argument which it had rejected in Baranski,
the court supported its position by referring to the
fact that no prosecutor had yet misused the stat-
ute, implying that such misuse was therefore un-
likely.
In admitting that the validity of the statute
was a close question, the court in Dellinger implic-
itly recognized a degree of ambiguity at least suffi-
cient to support arguments on both sides of the
issue. If the degree of ambiguity were as great as
the court implied in Dellinger, and if the court
70 See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM Or
ExPREssioN 9 (1970) ("[W]t is necessary to recognize
the powerful forces that impel men towards the elimi-
nation of unorthodox expression.") Cf. NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445 (1963) (Douglas, J., con-
curring). In Button, Mr. Justice Douglas specifically
noted the use of the statute to penalize defendants for
promoting desegregation. He viewed the statute as
infringing defendants' civil rights as well as their first
amendment rights.
7 But see Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 373 (1964):
"Well intentioned prosecutors ... do not neutralize
the vice of a vague law."; Thornhill v. Alabama, 311
U.S. 88 (1940).
72 484 F.2d at 568.




were applying the standards set by the Supreme
Court, it would seem difficult for the court to have
reached a conclusion that the possibility of prose-
cution was so minimal that it posed no threat to
first amendment rights.
In both Dellinger and Baranski the court began
with the same theoretical statement of the first
amendment overbreadth doctrine. Each case con-
cluded, however, by presenting a different func-
tional statement of the doctrine. In both cases the
court agreed that the nature of first amendment
rights created certain legal rules. It employed the
same general statement-of these rules. The rules,
however, have meaning in a legal system only in
relation tc specific conduct. If courts-differ in their
evaluation of this relationship, they have in effect
differed on the actual meaning of the rules them-
selves.
In Dellinger and Baranski the court in effect set
different factual requirements for the application
of the first amendment overbreadth doctrine. In
Dellinger, the court required a greater possibility
of improper prosecution than it did in Baranski.
In Dellinger, the court accepted a greater degree
of ambiguity in the legislative history and in the
statutory language itself. The court in Dellinger
effectively held that the challenged language did
not pose a threat to first amendment rights which
was sufficiently great to require the court to in-
validate the statute. In Baranski the court gave
greater weight to first amendment rights and,
therefore, found that in essentially similar circum-
stances the same rules would require the court to
invalidate the statute in question.
The first amendment protects the individual's
right to freedom of expression.7" Thus, in a limited
sense, the resolution of a conflict involving first
amendment rights involves the balancing of the
interests of the individual against those of societyY7
7 For a discussion of the concept of natural or indi-
vidual rights, see Cahn, supra note 16, at 471.
76 As stated in United States v. Baranski, 484 F.2d
556, 569 (1973):
The determination whether a given law is unconsti-
tutional requires a subtle analysis that takes into
account a variety of factors, including a balancing
of competing interests and goals, those of the
Government and those of the individual.
Yet, as the Supreme Court stated in Dombrowski
v. Pfister, "Freedom of expression is of transcen-
dental value to all society and not merely those
exercising their rights." 7 To frame a question is,
in a sense, 'to determine its answer. Properly
framed, the resolution of the conflict involves a
balancing of equally important interests within a
society, rather than a simple balancing of interests
of the individual against those of the community.
In Dellinger and Baranski the court considered
the concept of freedom of expression in its rela-
tion to other conflicting values within society.
These decisions arrived at different conclusions
in balancing the valid need for a suppression of
violence against society's interest in freedom of
expression. The difference in conclusion did not
arise from any factual difference, but rather from
the evaluation and application of first amendment
principles. Both decisions are acceptable interpre-
tations of the Supreme Court decisions concerning
first amendment rights. They are not identical
interpretations, but positions at either end of a
continuum. While both decisions refer to the pri-
macy of first amendment rights, the Baranski deci-
sion gives greater importance to these rights in
determining to invalidate the challenged statute.
The Dellinger and Baranski decisions represent
a division within the Seventh Circuit, a division
as yet unresolved. The breadth with which a legis-
lature may act in suppressing violence remains
undefined. In his dissenting opinion in Dellinger,
judge Pell ably summarixed the considerations
implicit in the resolution of this problem:
An ideal state of civilization should find no person
in any jeopardy of loss of life or wellbeing from
violence irrespective of its motivation. To attain
that state, however, by suppression of ideas and
beliefs would be a pyrrhic sacrifice of a krecious
freedom for an illusory safety.Y
- 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
78 See Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 H~Av.
L. REv. 1, 2 (1943):
When it comes to weighing or valuing claims or
demands, we must be careful to compare them on
the same plane. If we put one as an individual
interest and the other as a social interest we may
decide the question in our way of putting it.
Cf. McKay, supra note 16, at 1200.
79 472 F.2d at 416.
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